کثرت‌گرایی فقهی، الگوی پایه برای تاسیس و توسعه کثرت گرایی دینی

Jurisprudential pluralism (al-taʿaddudiyya al-fiqhiyya), as one of the most consequential theoretical achievements in the history of Islamic thought, raises a fundamental question: can this paradigm be extended beyond the domain of jurisprudence (fiqh) into the spheres of doctrine (iʿtiqādāt) and theology (kalām)? Employing an analytical–comparative method, the present study examines the epistemological and theological foundations of the doctrines of takhṭiʾa (the fallibilist position, prevalent in the Imāmī tradition) and taṣwīb (the position affirming the correctness of every qualified mujtahid, prevalent in the Sunnī tradition), and advances two principal arguments. First, jurisprudential pluralism—insofar as it is predicated upon the theory of takhṭiʾa—is rooted in the recognition that the jurist (faqīh) is liable to error notwithstanding the methodological rigor of his endeavor. Second, the rational grounds undergirding takhṭiʾa—among them the distinction between truth itself and the apprehension of truth, the principle of divine justice (qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bilā bayān, the rational repugnance of punishment in the absence of prior declaration), the conception of authoritative warrant (ḥujjiyya) as at once obligation-establishing (munajjiz) and exculpatory (muʿadhdhir), and the fallibility of the non-infallible (ghayr al-maʿṣūm)—are susceptible of extension to the doctrinal domain. The taṣwīb position, by contrast, lacks such capacity for extension on account of its relativist entailments and the rational impasses it generates—chief among them the conjunction of contradictories (ijtimāʿ al-naqīḍayn) and preference without a preponderating ground (tarjīḥ bilā murajjiḥ).