از حکمت پدرانه تا حرکت استادانه‌ی مهره‌های شطرنج (نابسندگی تمثیل‌های خداباوران شکاک در دفاع از اصل نارسایی معرفتی)

Skeptical theism—now among the most prominent responses to the problem of evil—rests on what I call the Epistemic Insufficiency: given our cognitive limitations, it is epistemically appropriate to doubt that we can, in every case, attain a detailed and comprehensive grasp of all of God’s reasons and purposes. A common strategy for defending this appeals to analogies, chief among them Wykstra’s well-known Parent Analogy. This paper argues, however, that Alston’s Chess Analogy is in important respects less vulnerable than the Parent Analogy and has not received adequate attention in skeptical theism. I first formulate the Parent Analogy and examine its principal difficulties; I then show how the Chess Analogy avoids some of these shortcomings. Beyond this comparative point, I contend that exclusive reliance on analogies faces a deeper challenge: even the best analogies are insufficient to bear the full argumentative weight required to defend skeptical theism. I conclude by proposing that such analogies be retained not as stand alone arguments, but as heuristic devices that clarify and visualize the limits of human cognition.