پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)

مسئله شر در الهیات نیک-غایت‌انگار با تأکید بر آرای جان بیشاپ و کن پرسزیک

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسنده

استاد همکار، کالج انطاکیه، اوهایو، ایالات متحده آمریکا

چکیده

برای برون رفت از چالش «شر موجود»، که در قالب برهان منطقی شر مطرح می‌شود، فیلسوفان خداباور سعی در نشان دادن سازگاری منطقی شر و وجود خداوند داشته‌اند. اما عمده دفاعیات مطرح‌شده در این زمینه، که بر اساس پیش‌فرض خدای متشخص ارائه شده‌اند، مجدداً به چالش کشیده شده و اعتبار آنها مورد خدشه واقع شده است. این مطلب متفکرانی مانند بیشاپ و پرسزیک را بر آن داشته که پیشنهاد تصور جایگزین از خداوند را ضمن حفظ آموزه‌های مسیحی در آن مطرح کنند. به نظر آنها کم‌چالش‌ترین تصوری که می‌توان از خداوند ارائه داد در قالب الهیات نیک-غایت‌انگار بیان می‌شود. این نوع الهیات، که بر تعبیر خاصی از خدای نامتشخص استوار است، جهان را به عنوان یک کل هدفمند و بدون خالقِ فراطبیعی می‌نگرد که به سوی غایت خود، یعنی عشق یا خیر اعلی، در سریان است. اما نه به این معنا که خیر اعلی در نهایت محقق خواهد شد، بلکه بالفعل محقق و در واقعیت همه موجودات جاری است. بر این مبنا، شرور به عنوان نتایج طبیعی سیروت عالم فیزیکی به سوی خیر اعلی بروز می‌کنند، در حالی که خداوند علت یا مسئول وجود آنها نیست.

کلیدواژه‌ها

موضوعات

عنوان مقاله [English]

The Problem of Evil in Euteleology Based on the Viewpoints of Bishop & Perszyk

نویسنده [English]

  • Siavash Asadi

Adjunct Faculty Member, Antioch College, Yellow Spring, Ohio, USA

چکیده [English]

In addressing "the logical problem of evil," theistic philosophers have sought to demonstrate the logical compatibility of evil and the existence of God. However, most of the defenses presented in this context which are based on the presumption of a personal God, have been criticized and questioned. This issue has led thinkers such as Bishop & Perszyk to propose an alternative conception of God while maintaining Christian doctrines. According to them, the least contentious conception of God can be articulated within the framework of euteleology. This theological view, which is based on a particular interpretation of an impersonal God, sees the world as a purposeful whole without the need for a supernatural creator, moving towards its ultimate end, namely, love or the highest good. However, this does not imply that the highest good will eventually be realized, but rather that it is already actualized and present within the reality of all beings. In this view, evils manifest as natural consequences of the unfolding of the physical world towards the highest good, without God being the cause or responsible for their existence.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • evil
  • impersonal God
  • euteleology
  • John Bishop
  • Ken Perszyk
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پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
دوره 23، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 45
فروردین 1404
صفحه 155-169