Multiverse and its Implications for Positivism, Naturalism, and Atheism

The multiverse is a pivotal subject in modern cosmology, triggering extensive debates across diverse disciplines, ranging from the natural sciences to philosophy and theology. In particular, some scholars have characterized the multiverse as an atheistic theory, taking stances either in favor of or against the multiverse based on this attitude. This paper first introduces the multiverse concept with sufficient scientific rigor, arguing that there is adequate motivation to treat it as a legitimate scientific theory. Subsequently, we argue that the multiverse is not merely a non-atheistic theory—in the sense of not inherently contradicting theism—but can also be utilized to challenge certain atheistically-inclined philosophical perspectives on science. Specifically, we examine how the multiverse challenges empiricism, as a basis for positivism, as well as the ontological naturalism and the common claim of its logical entailment from science. Furthermore, we briefly discuss the debate over whether the multiverse hypothesis or an “intelligent designer” is a preferred explanation for “fine-tuning for life.” We argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, treating the situation as a competition between atheism and theism—rather than as a competition between two scientific theories—is not only unnecessary, especially for theists, but may even be counterproductive. By generalizing these arguments to the broader aims of science, we conclude that—since the objective of science is to achieve "sufficient explanation,” not necessarily "complete explanation”—the absence of reference to certain causal relations—including those involving God— in the scientific explanation cannot be interpreted as evidence of the non-existence of such relations.