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    <title>Philosophy of Religion Research</title>
    <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/</link>
    <description>Philosophy of Religion Research</description>
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    <pubDate>Sun, 04 Oct 2026 00:00:00 +0330</pubDate>
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    <item>
      <title>From Natural Theology to Naturalism, and Back Again</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78350.html</link>
      <description>This paper investigates the historical and analytical trajectory of the confrontation between theism and naturalism. It demonstrates how naturalism, bolstered by the achievements of modern science, gradually supplanted natural theology as the dominant worldview in academia. This transition is traced through four historical stages: the conflict between science and sacred texts; the denial of divine agency; the post-Darwinian rejection of the necessity for a designer; and finally, the attempt to provide a purely naturalistic explanation of human nature. However, the central argument is that this victory is not definitive. In recent decades, naturalism has faced profound conceptual and empirical challenges that undermine its fundamental pillars. On the one hand, in the realm of human existence, phenomena such as consciousness (the &amp;amp;ldquo;hard problem&amp;amp;rdquo;), intentionality, free will, and rationality resist physicalist reductionism. On the other hand, naturalistic assumptions regarding the physical world have been shaken by new findings in cosmology (the origin of the universe and fine-tuning) and biology (biological complexity and evidence of teleology). Ultimately, the article concludes that these challenges not only erode the credibility of comprehensive naturalism but also pave the way for a resurgence of natural theology grounded in scientific and philosophical evidence.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Issue's ID</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78198.html</link>
      <description/>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Near-Death Experiences: The Philosophical Implications of the Existing Ambiguities</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78175.html</link>
      <description>Despite half a century of debate and investigation into near-death experiences (NDEs), several aspects of this phenomenon remain ambiguous and unresolved. The uncertainty regarding the prevalence of NDEs, their specific components, and the precise timing of their occurrence are among the most significant ambiguities. This paper, after reviewing various definitions of the term "near-death experience" and explaining the aforementioned ambiguities, examines the philosophical implications of these uncertainties, particularly in relation to supernatural explanations. The findings suggest that most NDEs are more closely associated with altered states of consciousness than with death itself. Consequently, the use of the term "near-death experience" for many alleged cases should be approached with skepticism. The ambiguity surrounding the specific components of NDEs, which is complicated by the problem of cluster structures, not only challenges researchers in identifying the essential elements of the experience but also makes it difficult for proponents of supernatural explanations to substantiate their claims. Furthermore, the difficulty in determining the precise timing of NDEs&amp;amp;mdash;often dependent on verifying so-called out-of-body observations&amp;amp;mdash;poses a potential challenge for advocates of supernatural explanations.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Solution to the Existential Problem of Evil: An Analysis of a Neglected Cognitive Loop</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78351.html</link>
      <description>The existential problem of evil is a crisis that theists experience when confronted with unjustifiable suffering. Using a descriptive-analytical method and an interdisciplinary approach (philosophical, psychological, and theological), the present study investigates the causal structure of this problem. It demonstrates that the existential problem of evil possesses a multi-layered structure in which "belief" functions as an "intrinsic element" and a mediating factor between the "occurrence of evil" and its "emotional-behavioral consequences". By focusing on this intrinsic element, this paper presents the foundational requirements and the necessary theoretical framework for designing any practical solution, such that emphasis is placed on the changeable factor (beliefs) without falling into the essence-accident fallacy. Consequently, the present analysis provides a solid theoretical foundation for the idea that overcoming the crisis requires transforming theoretical knowledge into existential belief and employing practical techniques for internalizing meaning in suffering. This transition, as a transformation in the lived pattern, encompasses the entirety of the individual's being.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Studies on the Core of Religion Leading to the De-identification of Religion</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78055.html</link>
      <description>Study on the core of religion can be considered one of the necessary and beneficial steps in the direction of subject identification. A movement that, if continued and placed on the right path, could be effective in moderating and correcting the prevailing reductionist approaches and help to repair and strengthen various fields of study of religion. However, this endeavor, stemming from its roots in Christianity and modern West, took a course that was at odds with its original purposes. Rather than distinguishing it from similar categories and emphasizing the aspects of distinction, it promoted the de-identification of religions. Continuing this trend not only deprives objectivity from studies of religion, but also disregards the significant distinctions among religions, leading to the weakening and eventual extinction of the knowledge that it has fed on and from which it has gained its credibility. Another consequence of persisting in this trend is a change in purposes, moving from a position of understanding religion to a kind of constructing religion.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Comparative Analysis of &amp;ldquo;Mystical Disembodiment&amp;rdquo; (Khalʿ al-Badan) in Illuminationist Philosophy and &amp;ldquo;Out-of-Body Experience&amp;rdquo; in Contemporary Empirical Approaches</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78352.html</link>
      <description>The phenomenon of the separation of consciousness from the physical body has been one of the most mysterious and, at the same time, most enduring human experiences throughout history. This paper compares two important approaches in this regard. On the one hand, &amp;amp;ldquo;mystical disembodiment&amp;amp;rdquo; (also called voluntary death) in the illuminationist, as a spiritual habitus, is considered the culmination of a willful, philosophical wayfaring and is predominantly active and agentive. On the other hand, &amp;amp;ldquo;out-of-body experience&amp;amp;rdquo; (OBE) in contemporary empirical approaches is often described as a &amp;amp;ldquo;natural occurrence&amp;amp;rdquo;, passive and accidental. The main issue of the research is to analyze these two approaches and explain the essential differences between them, despite their apparent similarities. This analysis, which was carried out with a descriptive-analytical approach and in a comparative manner, showed that &amp;amp;ldquo;mystical disembodiment&amp;amp;rdquo; in Suhrawardi&amp;amp;rsquo;s thought is an active, voluntary, teleological act and is completely included in a coherent metaphysical system that can also lead to epistemic &amp;amp;ldquo;certainty&amp;amp;rdquo;. In contrast, the &amp;amp;ldquo;out-of-body experience&amp;amp;rdquo;, according to the analysis of contemporary empirical approaches, is a largely passive phenomenon, devoid of teleology, and suspended in an &amp;amp;ldquo;interpretive vacuum&amp;amp;rdquo; between neurological data (requiring neurophenomenology) and realist approaches. The results of the research show that the main difference between these two analyses can be proposed in four key axes: 1. agency (voluntary versus passive), 2. teleology (epistemically oriented versus purposeless), 3. ontology (vertical journey to the Mundus Imaginalis versus horizontal journey in the physical world), and 4. explanatory power (the capacity of Suhrawardi&amp;amp;rsquo;s model to resolve the deadlocks of the realist approach).</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Peter Berger's Perspective on the Crisis of the Meaning of Life in Modern Societies</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78174.html</link>
      <description>The modern era has bestowed many gifts upon humanity, but with regard to the meaning of life, this optimism is questionable, and many sociologists have acknowledged the contrary. This article specifically examines Peter Berger's perspective on the crisis of the meaning of life in modern societies. The research method employed is interpretative textualism, inspired by John Plamenatz. The main findings of this study indicate that Berger's perspective on the crisis of meaning in modern societies evolves through three distinct phases, with his third view demonstrating greater coherence and comprehensiveness than his first two. Based on the formulation derived from his perspective, he initially identified secularization, and subsequently pluralization, as the cause of the crisis of meaning in modern societies. In his third view, he integrated his first perspective with the second, arguing that within a context of secularization, the pluralization of thought becomes possible, and the crisis of meaning in modern societies is explained by such conditions.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Non-cognitive Content in Analysis of Religious Language</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78353.html</link>
      <description>Do religious sentences have factual content and refer to some religious reality? One answer to this question is formulated in terms of the moderate attitude theory. According to this theory, religious sentences conventionally express both non-cognitive states, such as emotions, and cognitive content, thereby expressing the speaker&amp;amp;rsquo;s religious belief. Michael Scott argues that all attitude theories, including the moderate attitude theory, must provide an account of the attitudes corresponding to religious sentences in a way that be capable of accommodating the distinctions and nuances among such sentences. According to Scott, however, providing such an account poses a serious challenge for these theories, and is more difficult for them than for attitude theories in ethics. In this paper, I argue that, insofar as the moderate attitude theory takes the content of religious sentences to consist of both a cognitive and a non-cognitive component, it can assign the explanatory burden of accounting for the distinctions among the diverse and varied religious sentences to the cognitive component. Thus, either the moderate attitude theory does not face Scott&amp;amp;rsquo;s challenge in the first place, or, if it does, it can readily meet it. I further argue that this formulation of the moderate attitude theory does not diminish the value or significance of the non-cognitive component in the content of religious sentences.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Kant and the Problem of the Meaning of Life</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78054.html</link>
      <description>In Kant's ethical theory, the meaning of life lies in fulfilling moral duties, following rational principles, and respecting the categorical imperative. Kant believes that a moral life is inherently meaningful, and the ultimate goal of human beings should be the realization of justice, freedom, and respect for moral values. He emphasizes that the meaning of life is not found in the pursuit of individual happiness, but in the effort to act according to moral and rational principles. Kant introduces the concept of practical reason as the human ability to act based on moral principles, which enables an individual not only to understand what is right but also to act accordingly. He also stresses the importance of the good will as the foundation of morality, a will that acts out of duty and moral principles, rather than personal outcomes or self-interest. Kant presents the categorical imperative as a guide for moral action, according to which every action must be such that it could be accepted as a universal law for all. Furthermore, he emphasizes human autonomy and freedom, which allow individuals to make decisions based on reason and moral principles. Ultimately, Kant regards the supreme good as the ultimate goal of life, a combination of virtue and happiness. For him, a meaningful life is achieved when individuals act according to moral principles and strive toward the realization of the supreme good.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Reconceptualizing Revelation in Nathan S&amp;ouml;derblom's Science of Religion</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78374.html</link>
      <description>This study addresses the question of how Nathan S&amp;amp;ouml;derblom&amp;amp;mdash;a prominent historian and phenomenologist of religion&amp;amp;mdash;interpreted revelation within religion. While Western scholarship has previously examined S&amp;amp;ouml;derblom's position on revelation, the present research distinguishes itself through its comprehensiveness and its critical engagement with divergent scholarly interpretations. The study is organized around several axes: the relationship between revelation and religion in S&amp;amp;ouml;derblom's science of religion, the origin of revelation, the types of revelation, and its continuity throughout history. Together, these axes yield a comprehensive account of revelation in his science of religion. The paper concludes that S&amp;amp;ouml;derblom's interpretation of revelation, though grounded in a Christian framework&amp;amp;mdash;particularly in its claims regarding the centrality of revelation in religion, the origin of revelation, and divine self-disclosure in Jesus&amp;amp;mdash;nonetheless contains innovative elements. In this innovative reading, revelation is located at a higher level of human consciousness and is situated along the axis of religious genius. Furthermore, revelation is construed as the central marker of his discourse, and the point of encounter among religions, and its traces can be extended to so-called primitive religions.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Emil Fackenheim and the Reinterpretation of Jewish Theology in Light of the Holocaust: An Analysis and Critique</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78179.html</link>
      <description>Emil Fackenheim, one of the most prominent post-Holocaust theologians, endeavored to reconstruct Jewish theology in light of the Holocaust. According to the authors' analysis, his theological reconstruction revolved around five central tenets: the presence or absence of God, evil and theodicy, the biblical covenant, the meaning of history, and the possibility of faith's survival. Fackenheim considered the Holocaust to be a &amp;amp;ldquo;demonic&amp;amp;rdquo; evil and deemed traditional theodicies inadequate. In his view, from the ashes of Auschwitz, a "commanding voice" is heard, calling upon Jews to uphold the "614th Commandment." Therefore, Jews are invited to respond responsibly to atrocities and "epoch-making events," and thus must abandon the passivity of awaiting a future messianic age. This theological analysis leads Fackenheim to a politico-religious imperative: since the Holocaust was a product of the historical powerlessness of the Jews and the lack of support from other nations, the establishment of the State of Israel is not merely a political choice but a religious duty and the primary instrument for "Tikkun Olam" (repairing the world) and the survival of Jewish identity. Fackenheim not only supports the establishment of the State of Israel but, in a way, bestows upon it necessity and sanctity. This political theology, however, faces fundamental critiques, including: reliance on the shaky foundations of an argument, the uncritical sanctification of an earthly state, and most importantly, the creation of a "moral blind spot" that, by focusing on the historical suffering of Jews, fails to see the present suffering of Palestinians.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>From Parental Wisdom to Grandmaster&amp;rsquo;s Move: The Insufficiency of Skeptical Theist Analogies in Defense of the Principle of Epistemic Limitation</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78375.html</link>
      <description>Skeptical theism, now regarded as one of the most important responses to evidential arguments from evil, rests on the Principle of Epistemic Limitation, which may be briefly formulated as follows: If theism is true, then, given our cognitive limitations, we should be skeptical of our ability to attain, in every situation, a detailed and comprehensive understanding of all of God&amp;amp;rsquo;s reasons and plans for organizing the world. One common way of defending this principle is to appeal to analogies. This article analyzes and evaluates two prominent examples: Wykstra&amp;amp;rsquo;s parent analogy and Alston&amp;amp;rsquo;s chess analogy. First, it argues that, despite its considerable prominence in the skeptical theist literature, the parent analogy is not particularly successful in representing the epistemic gap between humans and God, because comparing an adult human being to a nine-month-old infant presents an exaggerated picture of the human cognitive condition. The article then reconstructs the chess analogy and shows that it offers a more apt representation of the epistemic gap between humans and God, since, unlike the parent analogy, it depicts this gap within a framework of shared rules and concepts while preserving the possibility of limited knowledge. Nevertheless, this analogy, too, faces difficulties when employed as an analogical argument, since relevant disanalogies between its source and target domains weaken its argumentative force, and it cannot, on its own, provide sufficient support for the Principle of Epistemic Limitation. Accordingly, by distinguishing between the argumentative and clarificatory functions of analogies, the article concludes by proposing that these analogies be used not as analogical arguments but, alongside independent arguments advanced by skeptical theists, as illustrative devices for eliciting intuitive understanding.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Explicating a Composite Theodicy in the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani: The Case of Mohammad Hossein Assar</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78178.html</link>
      <description>This paper presents a critical exposition of the theodicy of natural evil as formulated by Mohammad Hossein Assar, a prominent contemporary thinker within the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani. Assar constructs a theological framework that deliberately eschews the ontological foundations of Sadrian philosophy. The cornerstone of his argument is a radical semantic and ontological redefinition of "natural" versus "moral" evil. He delineates a tripartite typology&amp;amp;mdash;purely natural, purely moral, and hybrid&amp;amp;mdash;whereby he defines purely natural evil as an axiologically neutral, ontic (takwīnī) event. This re-conceptualization allows him to assert that the divine creation of such phenomena is entirely consistent with God&amp;amp;rsquo;s benevolence. Assar&amp;amp;rsquo;s solution culminates in a composite theodicy integrating three distinct strands of thought. At its core is a "Hidden Reasons" theodicy, which posits that the ultimate divine wisdom (ḥikma) behind natural suffering remains largely inaccessible to human cognition, apart from that which God reveals. This foundation is augmented by, first, an extended Libertarian framework that uniquely implicates creaturely free will in the genesis of all natural evils, and second, a doctrine of "Conditional Divine Benevolence," which contends that God&amp;amp;rsquo;s goodwill is not universally or unconditionally bestowed upon all humankind.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Analytical Critique of Objections to the Argument from Trust in Proving Prophetic Infallibility</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78376.html</link>
      <description>Prophetic infallibility is a central issue in Shiʿi theology and plays a decisive role in the credibility of revelation and legitimacy of prophethood. Among rational arguments for infallibility, the &amp;amp;ldquo;Argument from Trust&amp;amp;rdquo; is significant because it rests on a psychological and social principle: the purpose of prophethood can be fully realized only when people have absolute trust in the prophet, and such trust requires complete infallibility in belief, religious rulings, and conduct. Using an analytical-critical method, this study examines three major objections to this argument. The first claims that trust is possible without complete infallibility by comparing prophets with non-infallible scholars or experts. This analogy is invalid, since prophets differ fundamentally in mission, verifiability of error, and scope of influence. The second objection holds that infallibility entails compulsion. In response, the study distinguishes essential impossibility from extrinsic impossibility and argues that infallibility is the perfection of free will, arising from intuitive knowledge and divine love, not a denial of agency. The third objection concerns the argument&amp;amp;rsquo;s limited evidential scope. This is answered by explaining infallibility as a firmly rooted moral disposition operative in all circumstances; even private sins or pre-prophetic faults would undermine public trust and prophetic dignity. The findings show that the Argument from Trust can establish the comprehensive infallibility of prophets in religious, epistemic, and social dimensions.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Relation of Human Will to Causality and Divine Knowledge: A New Explanation of the Problem of Free Will</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78176.html</link>
      <description>The common solution in Islamic philosophy to the problem of free will is of the kind that, while accepting the generality of causal necessity and God's eternal knowledge, seeks to find a place for human will (al-irāda). However, in this solution, the "Best of All Possible Worlds" (al-niẓām al-aḥsan) is reduced to the "only possible world", as if a confusion has arisen between God's knowledge and His wisdom, and the scope of God's power is constrained. Moreover, in this model, the explanation of will in human beings does not differ significantly from the explanation of will in animals. In the present paper, employing the method of philosophical analysis and taking as its foundation the theory of "the extensiveness of reality beyond existence" (accepting reality for possible worlds), and by providing a ground for accepting preference based on priority (awlawiyya) instead of necessity (ḍarūra), a different conception of the Best of All Possible Worlds is presented. This conception, while taking seriously the fundamental difference between human beings and other creatures, explains human free will in such a way that, while accepting the principle "a thing, as long as it is not necessary, does not come into existence" (al-shayʾ mā lam yajib lam yūjad) within each possible world, and negating its applicability to specifically human acts of willing, it becomes possible to defend the existence of various options before the human being and the possibility of choosing among them. This new explanation of the problem of free will, in addition to being immune to the objections raised against previous solutions, is also capable of resolving certain difficulties such as the problem of badāʾ.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Anti-Meaning and Theories of the Meaning of Meaning</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78377.html</link>
      <description>The concept of "anti-meaning" or "negative meaning" has emerged as a novel idea in contemporary philosophy and discussions about the meaning of life. Scholars such as Metz, Landau, and particularly Nyholm and Campbell have explored and expanded on the theory of anti-meaning. Nyholm and Campbell have formulated the theory based on existing normative theories regarding life's meaning. This paper aims to advance the literature on anti-meaning by framing the concept within a meta-normative domain. At the meta-normative level, the term "meaning" in "the meaning of life" encompasses three distinct interpretations: 1. Meaning as purpose, 2. Meaning as value, and 3. Meaning as intelligibility. The concept of anti-meaning is structured according to these three interpretations: 1. Anti-meaning based on purpose refers to a life characterized by conflicting and scattered goals; 2. Anti-meaning based on value signifies a life that possesses negative value; 3. Anti-meaning based on intelligibility occurs when elements of anti- intelligibility, such as contradictions in life and its narrative, are present.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Cognitive Explanation of the Problem of Evil: The Role of Cognitive Science in Enriching the Philosophical Dialogue</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78181.html</link>
      <description>The problem of evil, as a fundamental normative challenge in the philosophy of religion, argues that the existence of evils in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent God is paradoxical. This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach to explore the capacities of cognitive science in providing a psychological explanation of the problem of evil. The central research question is: how can cognitive science enhance our understanding of the formation and persistence of the problem of evil in the human mind, and what is the relationship between this psychological explanation and the philosophical response to the normative challenge of evil? The findings, presented through a systematic "four-level explanation," demonstrate that cognitive science&amp;amp;mdash;by identifying and analyzing underlying cognitive-affective mechanisms such as the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), Theory of Mind (ToM), the affective empathy system, and cognitive biases (e.g., the Just-World Hypothesis and Hindsight Bias)&amp;amp;mdash;can offer a comprehensive account of the process through which evil becomes a "problem." This four-level analysis&amp;amp;mdash;encompassing the levels of basic cognitive architecture, the dynamic interaction of mechanisms, the psychological function of theodicies, and individual differences&amp;amp;mdash;reveals that the paradoxical perception of evil results from the complex interplay of these mechanisms within the architecture of the human mind. Distinguishing between the psychological appeal and the philosophical validity of theodicies is a key achievement of this research, opening new horizons for critiquing and evaluating philosophical arguments. Consequently, cognitive science, by serving as a bridge between the realms of description and justification, enriches the philosophical dialogue on evil.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Jurisprudential Pluralism as the Foundational Paradigm for the Development of Religious Pluralism</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78379.html</link>
      <description>Jurisprudential pluralism, as one of the most consequential theoretical achievements in the history of Islamic thought, raises a fundamental question: can this paradigm be extended beyond the domain of jurisprudence (fiqh) into the spheres of doctrine (iʿtiqādāt) and speculative theology (kalām)? Employing an analytical&amp;amp;ndash;comparative method, the present study examines the epistemological and theological foundations of the doctrines of juristic fallibility (takhṭiʾa, prevalent in the Imami tradition) and juristic infallibility (taṣwīb, the position affirming the correctness of every qualified mujtahid, prevalent in the Sunni tradition), and advances two principal arguments. First, jurisprudential pluralism&amp;amp;mdash;insofar as it is predicated upon the theory of takhṭiʾa&amp;amp;mdash;is rooted in the recognition that the jurist (faqīh) is liable to error notwithstanding the methodological rigor of his endeavor. Second, the rational grounds undergirding takhṭiʾa&amp;amp;mdash;among them the distinction between truth itself and the apprehension of truth, the principle of divine justice (the rational repugnance of punishment in the absence of prior declaration (qubḥ al-ʿiqāb bilā bayān)), the concept of authoritativeness (ḥujjiyya) as binding (munajjiz) and excusing (muʿadhdhir), and the fallibility of the non-infallible persons&amp;amp;mdash;are susceptible of extension to the doctrinal domain. The taṣwīb position, by contrast, lacks such capacity for extension on account of its relativist entailments and the rational impasses it generates&amp;amp;mdash;chief among them the conjunction of contradictories (ijtimāʿ al-naqīḍayn) and preference without a preponderating ground (tarjīḥ bilā murajjiḥ). The study's central finding is that, on the basis of the ethics of belief and a theistic ethics, the speculative theologian (mutakallim), no less than the jurist, having exhausted his epistemic capacity, is&amp;amp;mdash;in the event of unintentional error&amp;amp;mdash;excused (maʿdhūr) and in possession of an authoritative proof (ḥujja). This approach, while safeguarding the singular truth of religion, lays the groundwork for constructive dialogue and peaceful coexistence among the Islamic schools of thought in the contemporary age.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Divine Action in a Lawful World: Why Dispositional Essentialism Is the Middle Way</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78180.html</link>
      <description>This paper begins with the question of which image of &amp;amp;ldquo;the law of nature&amp;amp;rdquo;, namely Humean regularism, nomological necessitarianism of Armstrong, or Dispositional Essentialism, provides the most coherent framework for explicating &amp;amp;ldquo;special divine action&amp;amp;rdquo; without undermining scientific realism or theological concerns. Our argument rests on two criteria sets. At the level of the metaphysics of science, we discuss the distinction between laws and accidental generalizations, the warranted reliance on counterfactuals, and testability; and at the level of theology, we address the preservation of divine agency and wisdom, the independence of natural causes, the distinction between general and particular divine action, and the management of the problem of evil. Relying on this framework, we show that regularity-based views incline toward occacionalism and undermine scientific realism, while Armstrong&amp;amp;rsquo;s necessitarianism risks dragging theology between deism and an incoherent interventionism. These deficiencies are fundamental and irremediable. By contrast, the paper defends dispositional essentialism. In this way, divine action can be understood as &amp;amp;ldquo;fine tuning conditions&amp;amp;rdquo; rather than contravening the law. Reading Cartwright's capacity-centered approach, the ceteris paribus clause is transformed from a weakening caveat into an explanatory condition for the manifestation of capacities. And with the Handfield's model of a &amp;amp;ldquo;law-abiding miracle,&amp;amp;rdquo; the uniqueness of the miracle is preserved without breaking the law. Concerning the problem of evil, this theory clears it of extraneous metaphysical puzzles and offers a more precise formulation for theological reflection. The final result is that an enhanced dispositional essentialism provides a single framework for the coexistence of divine action and natural causes.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>The Critical Examination of Swinburne&amp;rsquo;s Greater-Good Defense against the Hiddenness Argument</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78381.html</link>
      <description>This paper seeks to present an argument against Swinburne's two-fold greater-good defense against the argument from divine hiddenness. According to this argument, the gratuitous theological, philosophical, and moral costs of this defense prevent it from being a reasonable resort. Some of these costs arise from the structure of this defense, which consists in accepting all the premises of the argument and adding an additional premise to block the conclusion, while other costs stem from the explicit and implicit claims of that added premise. The theological costs of this defense include: the lack of moral value of prophets, the possibility of punishment for nonbelievers who mistakenly think they are honest agnostics, and the necessity of assuming an unbridled version of universalism. The philosophical costs include a form of metaphysical necessitarianism and entanglement in an epistemological dilemma, according to which either there is no honest agnostic, or theists will not succeed in their responsibility to guide nonbelievers toward theism. Attributing an inappropriate moral theory to God and sacrificing some individuals for a greater good are among the moral costs of this defense. Given these costs, it can be concluded that this defense is not a suitable way to respond to the argument from divine hiddenness.</description>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>Feminist Rhetorical Hermeneutics in Understanding Biblical Texts from the Perspective of Phyllis Trible</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78177.html</link>
      <description>Phyllis Trible, a feminist scholar of biblical texts, believes that a rhetorical hermeneutical approach to biblical texts can inspire women and pave the way for the reconstruction of a biblical theology. In her view, the biblical text interprets itself, and in this self-disclosure, it possesses an internal hermeneutic that allows for multiple possibilities of reading. The clues by which an interpreter can determine which meaning to adopt in order to attain a coherent understanding of the biblical text are identifiable within the text itself. For Trible, these clues are the metaphors, stories, imagery, and central themes of the Bible, by reference to which one must resolve the internal contradictions of the text. The biblical texts depict two conditions for women: subordination and equality. By appealing to the metaphor of the womb, the creation story of man and woman, the imagery of humanity being created in the image of &amp;amp;lsquo;ha-adam&amp;amp;rsquo;, the recovery of the stories of significant women in the Bible, and similar elements, Trible identifies the equality approach as the primary reading. In her interpretation of the passages concerning the subordination of women, she considers them to belong to the period after sin and the expulsion from the Garden. This state was not part of God&amp;amp;rsquo;s original design and is viewed as an inauthentic condition from which woman and man, by overcoming sin and &amp;amp;ldquo;disobeying disobedience,&amp;amp;rdquo; must emerge to become co-equal companions and, together, the image of God. She considers the God of the Old and New Testaments to be one, and uses the Hebrew language as the primary source for understanding the biblical texts.</description>
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      <title>Knowledge by Presence and the Truth-Tracking Core of Religious Belief: A Critical Assessment of Evolutionary Debunking Arguments (EDAs) in Mulla Sadra&amp;rsquo;s Transcendent Philosophy</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78378.html</link>
      <description>The rise of the CSR and the identification of cognitive mechanisms involved in the formation of religious beliefs have given rise to an epistemic challenge known as EDAs. These arguments posit that religious beliefs are products of mechanisms evolved for survival (fitness) rather than for discovering the truth&amp;amp;mdash;making them &amp;amp;ldquo;off-track&amp;amp;rdquo; and thus lacking epistemic justification. This study aims to formulate a foundational response to this challenge, centered on the theory of &amp;amp;ldquo;knowledge by presence&amp;amp;rdquo; (al-ʿilm al-ḥuḍūrī) in Mulla Sadra&amp;amp;rsquo;s transcendent philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mutaʿāliya). The research method is descriptive-analytical, utilizing library resources. The findings indicate that EDAs rest on the presupposition of representationalism; that is, they assume religious belief is fundamentally a form of mental representation. By contrast, in transcendent philosophy, the truth-tracking core of religious belief is grounded in the soul&amp;amp;rsquo;s immediate knowledge by presence of its existential poverty and intrinsic dependence upon the Source of being. Unlike representational knowledge (al-ʿilm al-ḥuṣūlī), such knowledge by presence is neither representational in nature nor the product of mediated cognitive mechanisms, and is therefore immune to evolutionary debunking. Accordingly, EDAs can challenge only the propositional and reflective dimension of religious belief, whereas its presentational core lies beyond their scope.</description>
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      <title>Evaluation of the Presuppositions of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness from the Perspective of Islamic Thought</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78183.html</link>
      <description>Schellenberg has claimed that if there is a God, His love must be manifested to all humans. But many humans do not find a manifestation of this love. The existence of such non-resistant atheists shows that such a God does not exist. In this article, to evaluate Schellenberg's claim, it has been shown that the structure of his argument is based on four assumptions, the correctness of which in the context of Islamic thought is seriously questionable. The first assumption: God must be at the highest level in terms of love and to all humans. While in Islamic thought, God's love is only for those who love Him and not all humans. The second is that: God must reveal himself to seekers without motives or illness. The article shows that this revelation was made comprehensively through the sending of messengers. Third premise: There are people who sincerely seek to understand God and have a relationship with Him but have not achieved such knowledge. In this paper it will be shown that neither the sincerity of these people's efforts, nor the great effort of these people, nor the lack of evidence are acceptable, because the knowledge of the message of the prophets is widely accepted. Fourth premise: It is expected that there is sufficient evidence to know such a God. This premise shows that the atheist is looking for a specific type of evidence that can be a witness to the existence of God. The believer can claim, based on the Islamic vision, that there are sufficient and numerous evidences for the existence of God that the atheist can achieve if he changes his expectations. As a result, these assumptions cannot be a prelude to Schellenberg's arguments. Therefore, the structure of his argument based on Islamic views collapses.</description>
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      <title>Multiverse and its Implications for Positivism, Naturalism, and Atheism</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78380.html</link>
      <description>The multiverse is a pivotal subject in modern cosmology, triggering extensive debates across diverse disciplines, ranging from the natural sciences to philosophy and theology. In particular, some scholars have characterized the multiverse as an atheistic theory, taking stances either in favor of or against the multiverse based on this attitude. This paper first introduces the multiverse concept with sufficient scientific rigor, arguing that there is adequate motivation to treat it as a legitimate scientific theory. Subsequently, we argue that the multiverse is not merely a non-atheistic theory&amp;amp;mdash;in the sense of not inherently contradicting theism&amp;amp;mdash;but can also be utilized to challenge certain atheistically-inclined philosophical perspectives on science. Specifically, we examine how the multiverse challenges empiricism, as a basis for positivism, as well as the ontological naturalism and the common claim of its logical entailment from science. Furthermore, we briefly discuss the debate over whether the multiverse hypothesis or an &amp;amp;ldquo;intelligent designer&amp;amp;rdquo; is a preferred explanation for &amp;amp;ldquo;fine-tuning for life.&amp;amp;rdquo; We argue that, contrary to the prevailing view, treating the situation as a competition between atheism and theism&amp;amp;mdash;rather than as a competition between two scientific theories&amp;amp;mdash;is not only unnecessary, especially for theists, but may even be counterproductive. By generalizing these arguments to the broader aims of science, we conclude that&amp;amp;mdash;since the objective of science is to achieve &amp;amp;ldquo;sufficient explanation,&amp;amp;rdquo; not necessarily &amp;amp;ldquo;complete explanation&amp;amp;rdquo;&amp;amp;mdash;the absence of reference to certain causal relations&amp;amp;mdash;including those involving God&amp;amp;mdash;in the scientific explanation cannot be interpreted as evidence of the non-existence of such relations.</description>
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      <title>Kant's Pre-Critical Possibility Proof for God's Existence as the Ground of Possibility: A Reconstruction</title>
      <link>https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78182.html</link>
      <description>The aim of this paper is to analyze and reconstruct Kant&amp;amp;rsquo;s possibility proof. By distinguishing real possibility from logical possibility and by appealing to the notion of real absolute necessity, this proof introduces God as the unique necessary being who serves as the ground of all possibilities and who exists with real absolute necessity. The argument is significant both from a historical perspective and in virtue of its implications for modal metaphysics, particularly with respect to the problem of the ground of possibilities and the truthmakers of modal propositions. As such, it has recently received renewed attention in contemporary Kant scholarship. After presenting the conceptual preliminaries, the present study examines four main steps of the possibility proof, following the interpretations and reconstructions developed within contemporary Kant scholarship: (1) the necessity of the existence of a ground for real possibilities; (2) the transition from de dicto necessity to de re necessity (that is, the existence of a necessary being); (3) the demonstration of the uniqueness of this ground; and (4) its simplicity. At each stage, the argument is given a logical reconstruction, the main challenges confronting it are identified, and a number of critical remarks and proposals are offered with a view to refining or revising the formulation and addressing these challenges. In the final section, by presenting a preferred reconstruction of the possibility proof, it is argued that the overall structure of the argument can be rendered shorter and more rigorous in a two-step form, while preserving its core content: The first step is to move toward finding at least one ground for some possibilities, and the second step is to claim that any ground for some real possibilities is a ground for all real possibilities, and therefore there exists one ground for all real possibilities.</description>
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