Evidential Challenges of an Agnostic for Theists and Atheists

Document Type : Original Research

Author
Gholamhossein Javadpoor
Assistant Professor, Department of Kalam, The Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran.
10.30497/prr.2025.246524.1931
Abstract
Agnostics maintain that one cannot/should not arrive at either an affirmative or negative belief regarding the existence of God, and the correct epistemological approach on this matter is suspension of judgment. This approach typically emerges within an evidentialist framework, where the epistemic validity of a proposition depends on the proofs and supporting evidence. If the available evidence fails to decisively affirm or deny the proposition, then the appropriate response is silence. From the agnostic perspective, the theism/atheism dichotomy is problematic for three reasons: (1) Theistic and atheistic beliefs are neither presuppositions nor basic and self-justifying propositions; (2) There is insufficient evidence to support either position, and all purported evidence is flawed or invalid; (3) Even if the evidence is considered successful, the arguments on both sides ultimately balance out, leading to epistemic equivalence. Consequently, all epistemic paths lead to the suspension of judgment, and neither theism nor atheism can claim valid epistemic justification. However, the agnostic position may be excessively stringent. The wholesale rejection of all evidence and the claim that the arguments are perfectly balanced risk leading to a form of radical skepticism. Moreover, by refusing to acknowledge the approach of the believers, agnosticism disregards the rationality of theists and atheists alike, failing to recognize the intellectual virtues that may underlie their respective positions.
Keywords
agnosticism
evidentialism
epistemic equivalence
basic beliefs
theism
atheism
Subjects
Feldman, Richard, and Earl Conee. 2004. Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Feldman, Richard. 2000. “The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60(3): 667–695.
Flew, Antony. 1972. “The Presumption of Atheism.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 2(1): 29–46.
Hanson, Norwood Russell. 1972. What I Do Not Believe and Other Essays. Edited by Stephen Toulmin and Harry Woolf. Dordrecht, Netherlands: D. Reidel.
Kenny, Anthony. 2009. “Atheism and Agnosticism.” In Philosophers and God: At the Frontiers of Faith and Reason, edited by John Cornwell and Michael McGhee. MPG Books Group.
Kenny, Anthony. 1992. What Is Faith? Essays in the Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Konyndyk, Kenneth. 1991. “Evidentialist Agnosticism.” Religious Studies 27(3): 319–332.
Le Poidevin, Robin. 2010. Agnosticism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McKim, Robert. 2001. Religious Ambiguity and Religious Diversity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
McLaughlin, Robert. 1984. “Necessary Agnosticism?” Analysis 44(4): 198–202.
Mizrahi, Moti. 2017. “Skeptheism: Is Knowledge of God’s Existence Possible?” European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 9(1): 41–64.
Oppy, Graham. 1994. “Weak Agnosticism Defended.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 36(3): 147–167.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1981. “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?” Noûs 15(1) 41–51.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1983. “Reason and Belief in God.” In Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press.
Schellenberg, J. L. 2015. The Hiddenness Argument: Philosophy’s New Challenge to Belief in God. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Scriven, Michael. 1966. Primary Philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Shalkowski, Scott. 1989. “Atheological Apologetics.” American Philosophical Quarterly 26(1): 1–17.
Swinburne, Richard. 2004. The Existence of God. 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Van Hook, Jay. 1996. “Knowledge, Belief and Reformed Epistemology.” In Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, edited by Michael Peterson. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilczewska, Sylwia. 2020. “Agnosticism I: Language, Perspectives and Evidence.” Philosophy Compass 15(6).