The Problem of Evil, Greater Good, and the Moral Objection

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
Seyyed Mohsen Eslami 1
Mohammad Saeedimehr 2
1 Postdoctoral Researcher, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Professor, Philosophy Department, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
10.30497/prr.2021.239960.1642
Abstract
Greater Good Theodicies are among the main responses to the problem of evil. These theodicies look for a greater good that can explain the consistency of the existence of evils and the existence of the omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good God. After reviewing some versions of this kind of theodicy and the conditions they aim to meet, a fundamental objection is discussed - the moral objection. According to the objection, the greater good theodicies in principle violate some moral principles, such as the Kantian principle of mere means or the Pauline principle. In response, the defender of the theodicies might argue that there are counter-examples to such moral principles. It is argued that although these counter-examples make room for a possible defense of the greater good theodicies, the mere fact that it might be at times morally permissible for human beings to violate those moral principles is not enough to claim that the same is true in the case of God. However, first, still there might be other ways for the defender to defend the greater good theodicies against the moral objections. Second, it is important to pay proper attention to the significance of greater good theodicies beyond the sphere of theology - that is, their importance to religious studies and their moral significance.
Keywords
The Problem of Evil
Greater Good Theodicies
Kantian Ethics
Religion and Morality
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