A Consideration of William Hasker's Open Theism Solution to Theological Fatalism

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
Fatemeh Ghalkhanbaz 1
Abdolrasoul Kashfi 2
Abbas Yazdani 2
1 Phd student of philosophy of religion, faculty of theology and islamic studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
2 Associate Professor at department of philosophy of religion, faculty of theology and islamic studies, Tehran University, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2019.2491
Abstract
William Hasker is one of the most important figures of open theism. The main characteristic of open theism is the denial of the divine foreknowledge to free actions in the future. Hasker has a specific analysis of the libertarian free will and, in defense of this concept, modifies the concept of divine omniscience, thereby transforming the theological fatalism argument into an argument in favor of the incompatibility of free will and foreknowledge. By presenting his own analysis of the distinction between hard/soft facts, the defense of power entailment principles and the rejection of the generalized power, he explains that divine foreknowledge implies that humans cannot refrain from the actions of which God has foreknowledge. That is, one of the main requirements for libertarian free will, the principle of alternative possibilities (PAPs), will not be realized, and this contradicts free will. However, we will show that Harry Frankfurt's counterexample falsifies Hasker's version of PAP, and for this reason, his open approach is problematic.
Keywords
" Power Entailment Principles"
"Hard/ Soft Facts"
"Libertarian Freewill"
"Principle of Alternative Possibilities"
"Agent Causation"
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Philosophy of Religion Research
Volume 16, Issue 2 - Serial Number 32
November 2019
Pages 197-221