Paul Horwich: Minimalist Theory of Truth and Scientific Realism

Editorial

Authors
Hooman Mohammad Ghorbanian
Sayyed Mohammad Ali Hojjati
Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1134
Abstract
In philosophy, the concept of truth has been always discussed through the debates about the semantic dimension and the definition of realism and anti-realism ; however, none of these definitions are considered to be a complete one and none satisfies all philosopher's expectations. Most of the theories whose innovators have thought of them to be a realist, appear to be anti-realist according other philosophers. In this article a fundamental definition of realism is presented which is based on the approach of a philosopher. Minimalist theory of truth is a deflationary theory presented by Paul Horwich. By using minimal theoretic concepts, this theory can explain the application of the predicate "…is true". In this article three claims are investigated; first, the argument that the minimalist theory is the possible minimal theory regarding truth theories and it should be included in all theories of truth.
The second claim is that if a philosopher suspects the consistency of autonomy of theoretical facts and their accessibility , his theory would be anti-realism, whether he intends to solve that problem or not; but, a realist philosopher doesn't see such a problem. The third claim is that if such a definition of realism is accepted, it shows that there is no relation between a theory of truth and realism; and, although this independency of the concept of truth from realism is correct concerning the minimalist theory of truth, but it should be accepted by realists because it can explain all the appearances and applications of truth predicate in all other definitions of realism.
Keywords
Theories of truth
Minimalist theory
Scientific realism
Anti-scientific realism
نبوی، لطف­الله (1384)، مبانی منطق و روش شناسی، تهران: دانشگاه تربیت مدرس، مرکز نشر آثار علمی.
هاک، سوزان (1382)، فلسفة منطق، ترجمة سید محمدعلی حجتی، قم: کتاب طه.
Devitt, M. (1991), “Aberrations of the Realism Debate”, Philosophical Studies, 61.
Dummett, M. (1978), Truth and Other Enigmas, London: Duckworth & Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Id. (1991), The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, London: Duckworth & Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Gupta, A. (1993-A), “A Critique of Deflationism”, Philosophical Topics, 21.
Id. (1993-B), “Minimalism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 7.
Horwich, P. (1991), “On the Nature and Norms of the Theoretical Commitment”, Philosophy of Science, 5.
Id. (1996), “Realism and Truth”, Nous, 30.
Id. (1998), Truth, 2 ed, Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Id. (2001), “A Defence of Minimalism”, Synthese. 126.
Kuhn , T. S. (1962), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chidago Press.
Miller, A.(2005), “Realism”, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Online).
Peirce, C. S. (1878), “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”, Popular Science Monthly, 12, pp. 286-302; Reprint in the Essential Pierce, selected philosophical essays, Bloomington: Indiana U.P.
Popper, K. (1962), Conjectures  and Refutations, NewYork: Basic Books.
Putnam, H. (1997), Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shapiro, S. (1997), Philosophy of Mathematics: Structure and Ontology, NewYork: Oxford University Press.
Soames, S. (1999), Understanding Truth, Oxford - New York: Oxford University Press.
Van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford - New York: Clarendon Press.
Id. (1985), “Empiricism in the Philosophy of Science”, in P. M. Churchland & C. A. Hooker (eds.) Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Wright, C. (1992), Truth and Objectivity, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.