Critical Analysis of Richard Rorty's Interpretation of Relation Between Self and World

Editorial

Author
Mohammad Asghari
Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, University of Tabriz, Tabriz, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1132
Abstract
This article attempts to consider critical analysis of richard rorty's interpretation on relation between self and world. Rorty believed in three models of relation between self and world. In first model, self and world are dividing to two layers. In second model, self has various layers and it is complex, but world has only one layer and it is not anything but atoms and void, which is subject to mechanical laws. Although there is representational relation between self and world in first and second models but there is not the same relation in the third model because there is not reality for representing. In this model, there is environment that we have causal, and not representational, relation with it. Rorty wants to avoid realism in interpreting of this relation but some traces of realism have been seen in his thought.
Keywords
Self
World
Representation
Causation
Realism
Rorty
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Philosophy of Religion Research
Volume 7, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
November 2009
Pages 153-174