An Investigation of the Impact of The Theory of Pragmatic Encroachment on the Argument from Religious Experience

Document Type : Original Research

Authors

1 M.A. Graduate in Philosophy of Religion, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

2 Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.

Abstract

Richard Swinburne, a contemporary English philosopher, argues that religious experiences can be valid evidence for the existence of God. Central to his approach is the “principle of credulity”, which maintains that if an individual has an apparent experience of God’s presence, that experience should be accepted as genuine unless there are strong grounds for doubt. Swinburne also upholds the “principle of testimony”, asserting that people’s reports of religious experiences are trustworthy unless there is compelling evidence to the contrary. Some critics, drawing on the “theory of pragmatic encroachment”, contend that principles like credulity and testimony are inadequate in significant matters or with far-reaching consequences. From the pragmatic encroachment view, the more consequential an issue, the greater the requirement for robust evidence before accepting it. Since belief in God has profound implications for both individual and social life, its acceptance, they argue, should rest on evidence beyond personal experience or the testimony of others. Thus, by this account, credulity and testimony are insufficient for establishing the reality of religious experiences. Nevertheless, the findings of this study suggest that pragmatic encroachment does not undermine the use of credulity and testimony in relation to religious experience. This is because knowledge—conceived as justified true belief—is not swayed by practical considerations. Therefore, as long as religious experiences and consistent testimonies generate certainty for the subject, applying the principles of credulity and testimony in discussions about God remains reasonable and justified.

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Main Subjects

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