Document Type : Original Research

Authors

• Mohammad Taher Karimi ¹
• Hasan Ghanbari ²

¹ Ph.D. Candidate in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

² Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Religions, and Mysticism, College of Farabi, University of Tehran, Qom, Iran.

Abstract

One of the neglected areas within the Islamic philosophy is the issue of Islamic moral philosophy. When the term “moral philosophy” is mentioned, it is often understood in its specific sense, that is, metaethics. One of the principal topics in metaethics, also referred to as analytical ethics, is the epistemology of moral propositions. The present study seeks to examine the epistemology of moral propositions from the perspectives of al-Farabi and al-Ghazali. In order to extract the views of al-Farabi and al-Ghazali regarding moral propositions, their approaches to the issue of moral good and evil (ḥusn and qubḥ) as well as their theories about syllogisms’ premises (mawādd al-ʾaqīsa) in logic are explored. Finally, an epistemological analysis of moral propositions is presented from the standpoint of these two thinkers. In the field of the epistemology of moral propositions, al-Farabi considers such propositions to be non-declarative (inshāʾī) – though not purely non-declarative – and conventional (iʿtibārī), holding that they function in a dialectical (jadalī) manner. Similarly, al-Ghazali also regards these propositions as non-declarative and conventional with a dialectical function; however, the difference lies in the fact that while al-Farabi grounds the conventional nature of moral propositions in reason, al-Ghazali traces the foundation of their validity to religion and thus maintains the religious nature of ethics.

Keywords

• moral philosophy
• metaethics
• epistemology
• al-Farabi
• al-Ghazali

Main Subjects

• Religion and Ethics