Some Critical Observations on Park’s Refusal of de Ray’s Argument against Metaphysical Naturalism

Document Type : Original Research

Author
Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Etemadoleslami Bakhtiari
Assistant Professor, Science and Technology Studies Group, Department of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran.
10.30497/prr.2024.246761.1939
Abstract
Christophe de Ray (2022) in “A New Epistemological Case for Theism” develops a new argument against metaphysical naturalism. He bases the first premise of this argument at least on two assumptions: (i) IBE requires the metaphysical belief, i.e. the belief that states of affairs generally have explanations, and (ii) there can be no causal relationship between the explainability of states of affairs and the metaphysical belief. Rejecting these assumptions, Park (2023) argues that (a) the metaphysical belief requires IBE, and (b) the states of affairs cause the metaphysical belief. This paper critically examines Park’s lines of argument. Firstly, it will be argued that his arguments against (i) carry ambiguities with themselves. Moreover, it is shown that Park’s arguments for (a) are problematic since he confuses the epistemological and ontological applications of the notion of explainability, in addition to the confusion between the process of forming a belief and justifying it. Last but not least, it is argued that his argument for (b) confuses the cause of metaphysical belief and the reason for it.
Keywords
Christophe de Ray
Seungbae Park
the metaphysical belief
IBE
the similarity belief
enumerative induction
Subjects
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