How to Apply the Principle of Credulity to Religious Experience, according to the Principle of Simplicity

Following C.D. Broad, Swinburne argues that the principle of credulity can be applied to religious experience. He contends that, based on this principle, religious experiences are real and can provide evidence for God's existence. In this paper, contrary to his claim, I argue that the principle of credulity cannot be applied to religious experience. To this end, firstly, I try to explain his view on the principle of credulity. My next step is to examine the critique proposed by William Rowe, which argues that since there is no clear distinction between real and illusory religious experiences, the principle of credulity cannot be applied in this context. In the following, I will assess the responses that claim religious experiences, like sensory experiences, can be evaluated, suggesting that the principle of credulity can indeed be applied to religious experiences. Finally, I will demonstrate that applying this principle to religious experience faces a more serious problem. Referring to the principle of simplicity, I argue that because the object of religious experience (God as infinite) is so complex, the principle of credulity cannot be applied to it. Consequently, we need to find another way to justify the epistemological value of religious experience.