Non-instrumental Reasons and the Problem of Skepticism in Conciliationism

Document Type : Original Research

Author
Jalal Abdollahi
M.A. in the Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology; Physics Teacher in Ministry of Education, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2023.243446.1789
Abstract
Conciliationism is one of the famous approaches to the epistemic challenge of peer disagreement. However, this approach faces many problems, the most important of which is skepticism: an agent ought to suspend judgment about any belief over which she encounters peer disagreement. Ghazaleh Hojjati in “Conciliationist Approach to the Challenge of Religious Disagreement,” tried to answer this problem relying on the non-instrumental (or synchronic) reasons. In this article, I scrutinize and examine this answer proposed by Hajati. After comparing non-instrumental reasons in empirical sciences, on the one side, and in religion and philosophy, on the other side, I try to show that although in empirical sciences, non-instrumental reasons are independent and impartial, non-instrumental reasons in religious issues will probably be biased and non-independent. Nonetheless, a conciliationist asserts that the sides of disagreement are rational to keep their opinions only when using independent and impartial non-instrumental reasons. Hence, it seems that Hojjati’s response cannot refute the skepticism resulting from conciliationism in religious (or philosophical) debates.
Keywords
disagreement
conciliationism
skepticism
non-instrumental reasons
experimental sciences  
چالمرز، آلن. 1395. علم و تولید آن. ترجمۀ مصطفی تقوی. قم: پژوهشگاه حوزه و دانشگاه.
حجتی، غزاله. 1397. «رویکرد مصالحه‌گرایانه به چالش اختلاف‌نظر دینی». پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین  31: 19-40. doi: 10.30497/prr.2018.2350
عبدالهی، جلال. 1400. «بررسی همتایی طرفین اختلاف‌نظر دربارۀ وجود خدا: عدم‌احراز همتایی». شناخت 14(2): 195-222. doi: 10.29252/kj.2022.223332.1060
عبدالهی، جلال، و سید علی طاهری خرم‌آبادی. 1402. «معرفت‌شناسی اختلاف‌نظر دینی: تقارن معرفتی، تجربه دینی و تببین بدیل». اندیشه فلسفی ۳(۲) :۸۹-۹۹. doi: 10.58209/jpt.3.2.89
عبدالهی، جلال، و سید هدایت سجادی. 1401. «بررسی انتقادی رویکرد ماریو آلای برای حل مسئله تعین ناقص نظریه‌های مکانیک کوانتومی در دفاع از رئالیسم علمی». پژوهش‌های فلسفی-کلامی 24(4): 101-126. doi: 10.22091/jptr.2022.8473.2744
گاتینگ، گری. 1379. «تقریری اصلاح‌شده از استدلال از طریق تجربه دینی». ترجمه پروانه عروج‌نیا. نقد و نظر 23-24: 350-372.
Alston, William. 1991. Perceiving God: The epistemology of religious experience. Ithaca: Cornell University Pres.
Choo, Frederick. 2021. “The epistemic significance of religious disagreements: Cases of unconfirmed superiority disagreements.” Topoi 40: 1139–1147.
Christensen, David. 2007. “Epistemology and disagreement: The good news.” Philosophical Review 116: 187–217.
Feldman, Richard. 2007. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” Pp. 194-214, in Philosophers without Gods, edited by Louise Antony. Oxford University Press.
Gutting, Gary. 1982. Religious belief and religious skepticism. University of Notre Dame Press.
Karimzadeh, Omid. 2018. “Against the equal weight view in the epistemology of disagreement.” Wisdom And Philosophy 14(56): 43-59. doi: 10.22054/wph.2019.27680.1481
Kraft, James. 2021. Incommensurability and wide-ranging arguments for steadfastness in religious disagreements: Increasingly popular, but eventually complacent. Topoi 40: 1148- 1160.
Lougheed, Kirk. 2020. The epistemic benefits of disagreement. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Van Helden, Albert. 2019. “Galileo.” Encyclopedia Britannica Online Academic Edition.