A Study of Nick Trakakis's Approach to Anti-Theodicy in Comparison with Meta-Theodicy and Critique of Theodicy

Document Type : Original Research

Author

Ph.D. Graduate in Theoretical Foundations of Islam, Ferdowsi University, Mashhad, Iran

Abstract

The problem of evil and theodicy are acknowledged as inherent parts of the philosophy of religion. But on the other hand, some are seeking a way to put an end to this issue. Nick Trakakis is one of them, who by passing over meta theodicy and critique of theodicy, finally sees the solution in “anti-Theodicy”. Relying on the objective and practical reality of evil, in addition to the moral, methodological, and metaphysical flaws of the current theodicies, he has revised the image of personal God. According to anti-theodicy, theodicies are based on a personal God, and this is an obstacle to the compromise between the existence of evil and God's benevolence. Nevertheless, anti-theodicy has faced criticism in terms of fundamentals, methodology, and the purpose. In this research, first, the difference between anti-theodicy, meta-theodicy, and critique of theodicy is discussed and then the definition and explanation of anti-theodicy from Trakakis's perspective are explicated. In the end, some of the most important objections to this theory are proposed: taking a monopolistic attitude toward the moral basis, having cognitive weakness in common attributes, being prejudiced in dealing with the problem, ignoring the main problem, not proposing an alternative explanation of evil, and returning to the logical problem of evil.

Keywords

Bishop, John. 2018. “Response to Trakakis.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Davies, Brian. 2006. The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil. New York: Continuum.
Oppy, Graham. 2018. “Response to Trakakis.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Peterson, Michael L. Hasker William Reichenbach Bruce R. Basinger David. 1991. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion: Oxford University Press.
Stump, Eleonore. 2018. “Response to Trakakis.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trakakis, Nick. 2003a. “Evil and the Complexity of History: A Response to Durston.” Religious Studies 39(4): 451-458.
Trakakis, Nick. 2003b. “God, Gratuitous Evil, and van Inwagen’s Attempt to Reconcile the Two.” Ars Disputandi 3(1): 288–97.
Trakakis, Nick. 2003c. “On the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies: A Reply to Tierno.” Sophia 42 (2): 99–106.
Trakakis, Nick. 2004. “Second Thoughts on the Alleged Failure of Free Will Theodicies.” Sophia 43 (2): 87–93.
Trakakis, Nick. 2005. “Is Theism Capable of Accounting for Any Natural Evil at All?” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 57 (1): 35–66.
Trakakis, Nick. 2006a. “A Third (Meta-)Critique.” Sophia 45 (2): 139–42.
Trakakis, Nick. 2006b. “Does Hard Determinism Render the Problem of Evil Even Harder?” Ars Disputandi 6 (1): 239–64.
Trakakis, Nick. 2006c. The God Beyond Belief: In Defence of William Rowe’s Evidential Argument from Evil. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
Trakakis, Nick. 2006d. “Why There Is Reason to Remain Sceptical of Durston’s Scepticism.” Religious Studies 42 (1): 101–9.
Trakakis, Nick. 2008a. The End of Philosophy of Religion. New York: Continuum.
Trakakis, Nick. 2008b. “Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil, or Part of the Problem?” Sophia 47 (2).
Trakakis, Nick. 2017. “Anti-Theodicy.” Pp. 124-144, in The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil. Cambridge University Press.
Trakakis, Nick. 2018a. “Anti-Theodicy.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trakakis, Nick. 2018b. “Reply to Bishop.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trakakis, Nick. 2018c. “Reply to Oppy.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Trakakis, Nick. 2018d. “Reply to Stump.” In The Problem of Evil: Eight Views in Dialogue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.