Philosophy of Religion Research
A Philosophical Approach to Friendship and Other-Concern With an Emphasis on the Neo-Aristotelian Philosopher Julia Annas in Morality of Happiness
Document Type : Original Research
Authors
1 Ph.D. graduate of Philosophy of Religion, Islamic Azad University, Tehran Science and Research Section, Tehran, Iran
2 professor of Philosophy, Philosophy and Islamic Theology Department, University of Qom, Qom, Iran
3 Professor at Islamic Azad University, Central Tehran Branch, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
With the revival of virtue ethics in 1958, new philosophical debates in the field of friendship emerged. Nowadays, the Neo-Aristotelians are reviving and modifying the ancient Aristotelian concepts. They are also reflecting on post-Aristotelian schools of antiquity. According to them, the most crucial demand in virtue ethics for achieving good interior life is the rational formation of internal feelings, emotions, and excitement. Some scholars have accused their theory of being egotistic, because of their emphasis on the interior part of human life. This article shows the role of other-concern and friendship in happiness and their importance in Aristotelian, post-Aristotelian, Neo-Aristotelian, and virtue ethics theories. We also explain how Julia Annas, as a Neo-Aristotelian philosopher, does not accept that the ancient theories of happiness are egotistic. Also, we describe what boundaries she puts for friendship and other-concern.
Keywords
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