پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)

رویکرد مصالحه‌گرایانه به چالش اختلاف‌نظر دینی

نوع مقاله : پژوهشی

نویسنده

دانشجوی دکتری فلسفۀ دین، گروه فلسفۀ دین، پژوهشکده حکمت معاصر، پژوهشگاه علوم انسانی و مطالعات فرهنگی، تهران، ایران

چکیده

از منظر مصالحه‌گرایان، پس از بروز اختلاف‌نظر در همتایان معرفتی، دیگر نمی‌توان به نحو معقولی بر باور یا میزانِ اطمینانِ قبلی خود استوار ماند. از این منظر، رویکردِ باوریِ معقول در مواجهه با اختلاف‌نظر تعلیق داوری یا کاستن از درجۀ اطمینان به باور قبلی است. بنا بر مصالحه‌گرایی دینی، تنوع ادیان چالشی جدی را پیش ‌روی توجیه باورهای دینی قرار می‌دهد که واکنش معرفتیِ معقول به آن یا تعلیق کردن داوری تا زمان یافتن شاهد مناسبی است که برتری یک موضع را بر موضع دیگر محرز سازند، یا پایین آوردن سطح اطمینان به باورِ «وجود/ عدم خدا» تا جایی که اختلاف‌نظر برطرف شود و باور طرفین تا حد ممکن به هم نزدیک شود. در این رویکرد، تا زمانی که شاهد مرجحی پیدا شود و سطح اطمینان به باور یکی از طرفین را تا حد باور بالا ببرد، هر دو طرف باید در همین وضعیت بمانند. به مصالحه‌گرایی سه اشکال جدی گرفته شده است: توجیه آسان، شکاکیت و خودمتناقض بودن. مصالحه‌گرایان برای اثبات درستی موضع خود ناگزیر از پاسخ دادن به اشکالات هستند. در پایان مقاله، نشان داده خواهد شد که هیچ یک از پاسخ‌های آنان پذیرفتنی نیست.

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

Conciliationist Approach to the Challenge of Religious Disagreement

نویسنده [English]

  • Ghazaleh Hojjati

PhD. Student of Philosophy of Religion, Department of Philosophy of Religion, Institute of Contemporary Wisdom, Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies, Tehran, Iran.

چکیده [English]

Conciliationists believe that after the emergence of disagreement between epistemic peers, one cannot reasonably be committed to her previous belief or her degree of confidence in that. From this viewpoint, reasonable doxastic attitude in confronting disagreement is suspension of judgment or reducing the degree of confidence in the previous belief. Religious conciliationists believe that religious diversity challenges the justification of religious believes so that the reasonable epistemic response is to suspend the judgment till finding some appropriate evidence that demonstrates the advantage of one position over the other, or to reduce the level of confidence in God’s existence/ non-existence to the extent that disagreement disappears and the two parties come close together. They hold that the two parties should be in such a position, unless one of them achieve some preferred evidence that raises her level of confidence close to belief. There are three serious objections to conciliationism: easy justification, skepticism, and self-contradictoriness. So, if they have to demonstrate their view, Conciliationists should inevitably answer these objections. In this paper, I will argue that none of their answers is acceptable.

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Conciliationism
  • Steadfast View
  • Higher-order Defeater
  • Equal Weight View
  • Independence Principle
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پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین (نامه حکمت)
دوره 16، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 31
اردیبهشت 1397
صفحه 19-40