Philosophy of Religion Research
Avicenna's Theory of God's Knowledge of Particulars; Investigating Marmura's Interpretation
Document Type : Original Research
Authors
1 PhD. Student, Faculty of Humanities, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
2 Professor at Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
3 Assistant Professor at Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Faculty of Humanities, Shahed University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Michael E. Marmura, an outstanding Avicenna scholar, has presented a special interpretation of Avicenna’s view concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. In this paper, which consists of two parts, we will examine his interpretation of Avicenna. In the first part, we briefly present Marmura’s reading of Avicenna’s theory of God’s knowledge of particulars. According to Marmura’s interpretation of Avicenna, God only knows, individually, particular entities which are the only member of their species. Also, He knows, individually, particular events which are attributed to such particular entities. Arguing that Avicenna’s theory is not able to explain God’s knowledge of ‘all’ particulars, Marmura concludes that Avicenna ‘believed’ that God does not know all particulars individually. In the second part, we will object his interpretation. The most important criticisms are as follows: he has not determined what problems Avicenna’s theory aims to solve; he has not touched two important elements of Avicenna’s theory, i.e., God’s knowledge of particulars by means of their forms, and God’s knowledge of particulars by means of His causal relation with them; and he presents an erroneous interpretation of Avicenna’s use of the eclipse example.
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