Roger Trigg on Religious Commitment and Rationality

Document Type : Original Research

Authors
Fatemeh Saeedi 1
Abdorasoul Kashfi 2
1 PdD. candidate in philosophy of religion, faculty of Islamic theology and teachings, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
2 Associate professor of Islamic philosophy,department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, faculty of Islamic theology and teachings, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
10.30497/prr.2018.2114
Abstract
Religious commitment and its relation to rationality has been always one of the important questions in philosophy of religion. Trigg is one of the contemporary philosophers who has considered this issue. In this article, we consider his view regarding the nature of commitment and its relation to belief, meaning, justification and rationality. He thinks that commitment has two elements: propositional belief and personal commitment to it. Since Trigg thinks that the first element is fundamental, this article concentrates on it. Concerning the first element, Trigg thinks that negation of “non-relativism” and “realism” are two true implications of religious commitment. So, he criticizes “non-realism” and “relativism”. He thinks that the effect of the thought of late Wittgenstein in reaction to logical positivism is prominent and it leads to separation of religion from science. Trigg criticizes this line of thought and tries to show its consequences. Emphasizing on language as showing the truth and making the relation possible and emphasizing on the common nature of human being, Trigg opposes conceptual relativism and seeks to open the way to rationality. In this article, we argue that although Trigg is successful in his criticisms, the affirmative aspect of his discussion lacks sufficient strength and precision.
Keywords
Roger Trigg
Religious Commitment
Conceptual Relativism
Realism
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