Philosophy of Religion Research
The New Logical Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense
Document Type : Original Research
Authors
1 PhD student of logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran.
2 Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. (Corresponding Author)
3 Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution.
Keywords
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