Reliabilism in Justification

Document Type : Original Research

Author
Masoud Alvand
MA student of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1233
Abstract
Reliabilism is one of the epistemological approaches, which is applied for analyzing both concept of knowledge and justification. One of the most famous justification theories in reliabilism approach is Alvin Goldman's. According to Goldman's theory, justified belief is a result of reliable epistemic process. But, we can consider a state in which, though a belief is a result of a reliable process, but the person has some evidences that above mentioned process, is un-reliable. Goldman's final analysis about justified belief consists of additional condition to adjust this problem. Reliabilism theory in justifying epistemic results as outputs and reduction of normative concept such as justifying these processes has a naturalistic aspect. This theory because of resorting to the concept of truth in definition of reliable process and considering justified belief as a well-formed belief is an externalist theory. Goldman's theory of justification has two problems known as generality problem and range problem. Foley and Feldman's criticisms about these problems cause to challenge Goldman's theory of justification and presenting other explanations of this theory.
Keywords
justification
reliabilism
naturalistic epistemology
internalism
range problem
generality problem

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Philosophy of Religion Research
Volume 1, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
November 2003
Pages 73-103