A priori Knowledge

In this article, two empiricists' approach towards important challenge of a priori and independent of experience knowledge is mentioned. The first stance is that, a priori knowledge is dependent on truths and analytic propositions i.e. propositions that according to the meaning of existing words are true. Author, critically gives several examples and believes that truths are synthetic not analytic and our knowledge of them is a priori. Second stance is Quine's. He refuses the difference between empirical and a priori truths and recognizes all truths to some degree as empirical and therefore revisable. Examining Quine's stance and reflecting more about nature of a priori knowledge, first, author discuses Kant's presuppositions; if the a priori truths must be universal and necessary? Applying Kripke theories, the author, contrary to Kant, attempts to explain that particular truths could also be understood as a priori. Quine's view about revisability of some truths, like non-contradiction law, is not defendable. To sum up, in this essay, two foundationalistic views towards problem of justification and a priori knowledge has been mentioned. Finally, different explanations of necessary truth and a priori knowledge in coherentist theory are explained.