A Critique of Coherentism

Document Type : Original Research

Author

Assistant Professor of Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Richard Fumerton is professor of philosophy at the University of Iowa. In this essay he argues that fundamental difficulties face any attempt to define justified belief in terms of coherence among beliefs. To be plausible, a coherence theory must embrace internalism, but a coherentist cannot give a reasonable account of our access to our own beliefs. Moreover, even rather strong coherence seems at once neither sufficient nor necessary for the justification of our beliefs.

Keywords

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Fumerton, Richard (1980), "Induction and Reasoning to the Best Explanation", Philosophy of Science 47.
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Pollock, John (1984), "A Solution to the Problem of Induction", Nous.