Do Natural Kind Terms Have Meaning?

Editorial

Author
Mohammad Sadiq Zahedi
Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Hikmah, Imam Khomeini International University, Qazvin, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1180
Abstract
Natural kind terms are those linguistic expressions which refer to the specific kinds. Usually it is supposed that it is its meaning that communicates between a natural kind term and its referent. This is the view that is called traditional theory of reference. According to this theory, every general term has a meaning in the mind and by understanding this meaning we can refer to its extension. This theory has been criticized in two directions: the first is the view that meaning is in the mind and the second is that meaning communicates between a term and its referent. In this paper I will explain the traditional theory of reference concentrating on Locke’s views and will explain the other philosopher’s views such as Frege and Putnam. Putnam’s theory of reference criticizes both aspects of traditional theory. At the end of the paper I will refer to the criticisms on Putnam’s theory.
Keywords
general terms
natural kinds
theory of reference
Locke
Frege
Putnam
Donellan, Keith (1973), "Substance and Individual", Journal of philosophy, LXX.
Frege, Gottlobe (1984), "On Concept and Object", in: P. Geach and M. Black (eds), Translations from the Philosophical Writings ofGottlobe Frege, Oxford: Blackwell.
Grayling, A.C (1997), An Iintroduction to Philosophical Logic, Oxford: Blackwell.
Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell.
Locke, John (1976), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press
Putnam, Hilary (1977a), "Meaning and Reference", in: Stephen Schwartz (ed), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Id. (1977b), "Is Semantic Possible", in: Stephen Schwartz (ed), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Id. (1997) "The Meaning of Meaning", in: Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge: University of Cambridge.
Quine, W.V.O (1994), From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge: HarvardUniversity Press.
Schwartz, Stephen (1977), Naming, Necessity and Natural Kinds, Ithaca: CornellUniversity Press.
Jackson, F. (1998a), Mind, Method and Conditionals, Selected Essays, London / New York: Routledge
Id. (1998b) "Reference and Description Revisited", Philosophical Perspectives, no.12, pp.201-218.
Chalmers, D. (1995), "The Components of Content", http://www.u.arizona.edu/ ~chalmers/papers/content.html;
Id. (1996), "The Conscious Mind", in: Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York / Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
Nimtz, Christian (2004), "Two- Dimensional and Natural Kind Terms", Synthese, vol. 138.
Philosophy of Religion Research
Volume 4, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
November 2006
Pages 23-44