Philosophy of Religion Research

Epistemological Justification according to Later Wittgenstein’s View from Foundationalism to Contextualism

Editorial

Authors

1 Assistant Professor at Payame Noor University, Bafgh,Yazdm Iran

2 Assistant Professor at Department of Islamic Philosophy and Kalam at Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

As the claim of knowledge without presenting the sufficient ground or evidence is unjustified, the basis of contemporary epistemology is what the foundation of the system of human knowledge is and that from where this system originates and where it ends. According to later Wittgenstein, the description of the word without a number of basic and certain propositions is impossible. Although their certainty does not mean their correspondence with the fact, it relies upon the attitude of the individuals. What is certain and evident for us is determined by a language game in which one partakes. Therefore, the human knowledge in itself depends on his actions and characteristic behavioural patterns. Wittgenstein maintains that justification and rationality rest invariably on context and engage in social activities and language games. Since forms of life, worldpictures and world – views are different, there are various ways of rationality.
In this article, elucidating the tripartite definition of knowledge, we have dealt with the analysis of knowledge and its distinctive aspect with certainty from wittgenstein’s view. Then, referring to the structure of epistemological foundations in wittgenstein’s thought, we have mentioned it, why according to him, foundationalism fails to defend the validity of epistemological system and with taking the theory of contextualism, what difference will take place in the foundations of knowledge and the quality of the dependence of other sciences on them.
Finally, studying the theory of contextualism and elucidating a number of its advantages, we have explained that this theory allows a version of relativism and is not without some kind of skeptical tendencies.

Keywords

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Philosophy of Religion Research
Volume 4, Issue 1 - Serial Number 1
May 2006
Pages 21-56