Philosophy of Religion Research
Avicenna's Ṣeddῑqῑn demonstration: a demonstration quid and having certain conclusion
Editorial
Authors
1 Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran
2 Associate Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Kalam, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
Avicenna's Ṣeddῑqῑn demonstration is regarded as one of the most acceptable arguments for proving the existence of God. Being a demonstratio propter quid (al- burhān al- innῑ) or demonstratio quia (al- burhān al- limmῑ) is a known challenge on this argument. According to some famous readings of Avicenna's expressions, demonstratio quia does not lead us to certainty and therefore is useless for proving the existence of God. On the other hand, there is no way to prove the existence of God using demonsteratio propter quid because God does not have any cause. Some scholars for getting rid of this problem claimed that this argument is an especial kind of demonstratio quid that the conclusion is proved by common dependencies (al- mulāzimāt al- ā̒ mmah) and so gives us certainty. Some other scholars believe that this argument is quasi demonstratio propter quid (shibh al- limm) and there are some scholars that take it as a demonstratio propter quid. This article attempts to defend this argument as a demonstratio quia. Avicenna regarded the conclusion of demonstratio quia certain although there is a kind of inconsistency in Avicenna's words in the realm of theological demonstration generally and Ṣeddῑqῑn demonstration in particular. Regarding this demonstration as demonstratio quia or demonstratio propter quid it is possible to remove this inconsistency applying Avicenna's philosophical principles.
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