Reference without Referent in Proper Names

Editorial

Author
Mohsen Zamani
PhD Student of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1140
Abstract
There are two approaches to semantics of proper names, Millian and descriptive theory. Each one satisfies some of our linguistics intuitions and does not satisfy others. Avoiding problems of those theories, Sainsbury has developed a hybrid theory, which is called "Reference without Referent" (henceforth: RWR). Firstly, I mention some motivations of suggesting RWR (solving some problems in modal context, providing an acceptable semantics for empty names and committing to Davidson's theory of meaning). Then I illustrate and criticize this theory. In last section I attempt to solve some puzzle which Millian theory comes from with them. Because RWR is more close to Millian theory rather descriptive theory, enabling to solve those problems shows that RWR can satisfy our linguistics intuitions better than two other alternatives.
Keywords
Proper names
Empty Names
Free Logic
Unwitting Baptism
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