Semantic Externalism: A Way of Refuting the Incommensurability Thesis

Editorial

Author
Hashem Morvarid
PhD Student of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, Tehran, Iran
10.30497/prr.2012.1137
Abstract
The incommensurability thesis, in philosophy of science, says that competing scientific paradigms/theories, although using the same terms, do not talk  about the same matter and so, the scientists who work in competing scientific paradigms or defend competing scientific theories cannot understand each other. This paper aims to examine and criticize the incommensurability thesis. I first try to elucidate the thesis in its historical context. For doing so, I focus on its two main proponents: Thomas Kohn and Paul Fayerabend. Then, I bring out the premises of their argument for the thesis. Finally, I use the theory of semantic externalism to reject a main premise of their argument. To explain the theory of semantic externalism, I focus on its tow most important defenders: Saul Kripke and Hillary Putnam. I believe that “semantic externalism is a way of refuting the incommensurability thesis”.
Keywords
Incommensurability thesis
Scientific revolution
Scientific paradigm
Fundamental scientific theory
Contextual theory of meaning
Meaning variance thesis
Semantic externalism
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