Being-for-itself in Sartre’s Philosophy

Editorial

Author

Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

Accepting the concept of “intentionality” in husserl’s philosophy, Sartre maintains that consciousness consists in consciousness of something. Consciousness has always an object and refers to something that is known. He does not believe that there is any reality, “noumenon”, lying behind the phenomena. On the other hand, he does not regard phenomenon as dependent on consciousness or the knowing subject. Phenomena are selfsustaining. Hence, we are confronted with two types of being: consciousness and the objects of consciousness or phenomena. Sartre calls the first type “being-in-itself” and the second type “being-for-itself”. Having dealt with Sartre’s phenomenological approach, this article examines some characteristics of “for-itself” such as nothingness and freedom. In addition, it deals with some structures of “for-itself” such as to be impersonal, to be nonsubstantial, lack and desire.

Keywords

کرنستون، موریس (1371)، ژان پل سارتر، ترجمة منوچهر بزرگمهر، تهران: انتشارات نیلوفر.
Catalano, Joseph (1980), a commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre’s “Being and Nothingness”, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Cochrane, Arthur (1956), the Existentialists and God, Philadelphia: The Westminster Press.
Desan, Wilfrid (1960), the Tragic Finale, New York: Harper and Brothers.
Edwards, Paul (1972), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.7, New York: Macmillan.
Green, Norman (1963), Jean-Paul Sartre; the Existentialist Ethics, Michigan: Ann Arbor.
King, Thomas (1974), Sartre and the Sacred, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Laycock, Steven (1991), “Nothingness and Emptiness: Exorcising the Shadow of God in Sartre”, Man and World, vol. 24.
McLachlan, James (1997), “the Theological Character of Sartre’s Atheology in Being and Nothingness”, Epoche, 5 (1-2).
Sartre, Jean-Paul (1948), the Psychology of Imagination, New York: Philosophical library.
Id. (1957-a), Being and Nothingness; An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, tr. Hazel Bernes, London: Methuen.
Id. (1957-b), the Transcendence of the Ego: An Existentialist Theory of Consciousness, tr. Forrest Williams and Robert Kirkpatrick, New York: Noonday Press.
Id. (1962), Situations I, tr. Annette Michelson, New York: Collier Books.
Warnock, Mary (1967), Existentialist Ethics, London: Macmillan.