Editorial
Authors
1 Assistant Professor of K. N. Toosi University, Tehran, Iran
2 Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran
Abstract
In this essay we have tried to research, analyze, and criticize the russell's correspondence theory of truth, considering the philosopher's developments during his intellectual life from his many works. The changes in his theory of truth are matched at every point by changes in his theory of belief. When he thought of belief as a mental attitude which was directed upon propositions, he hold truth and falsehood to be indefinable attributes of such propositions. When he came to think of belief as a relation between the mind and a multiplicity of objects, he adopted another version of correspondence. Later on, when turned propositions into contents of beliefs, he came to hold a correspondence theory of truth, in the most literal sense of the term. Consequently, he was led to adopt a different theory according to which an affirmative proposition of the observational kind is true if the replacement of each word by its meaning yields a fact.
In this research we have shown that russell, in spite of the all ups and downs in the stages of his philosophical developments, always, had kept correspondence theory. He, indeed, has given a version of the theory, in accordance with his intellectual system in each stage.
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