Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Near-Death Experiences: The Philosophical Implications of the Existing Ambiguities Near-Death Experiences: The Philosophical Implications of the Existing Ambiguities 1 17 78175 10.30497/prr.2026.248002.1995 FA Mojtaba Etemadinia Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy and Logics Education, Farhangian University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-6675-9026 Journal Article 2025 04 02 Despite half a century of debate and investigation into near-death experiences (NDEs), several aspects of this phenomenon remain ambiguous and unresolved. The uncertainty regarding the prevalence of NDEs, their specific components, and the precise timing of their occurrence are among the most significant ambiguities. This paper, after reviewing various definitions of the term "near-death experience" and explaining the aforementioned ambiguities, examines the philosophical implications of these uncertainties, particularly in relation to supernatural explanations. The findings suggest that most NDEs are more closely associated with altered states of consciousness than with death itself. Consequently, the use of the term "near-death experience" for many alleged cases should be approached with skepticism. The ambiguity surrounding the specific components of NDEs, which is complicated by the problem of cluster structures, not only challenges researchers in identifying the essential elements of the experience but also makes it difficult for proponents of supernatural explanations to substantiate their claims. Furthermore, the difficulty in determining the precise timing of NDEs—often dependent on verifying so-called out-of-body observations—poses a potential challenge for advocates of supernatural explanations. Despite half a century of debate and investigation into near-death experiences (NDEs), several aspects of this phenomenon remain ambiguous and unresolved. The uncertainty regarding the prevalence of NDEs, their specific components, and the precise timing of their occurrence are among the most significant ambiguities. This paper, after reviewing various definitions of the term "near-death experience" and explaining the aforementioned ambiguities, examines the philosophical implications of these uncertainties, particularly in relation to supernatural explanations. The findings suggest that most NDEs are more closely associated with altered states of consciousness than with death itself. Consequently, the use of the term "near-death experience" for many alleged cases should be approached with skepticism. The ambiguity surrounding the specific components of NDEs, which is complicated by the problem of cluster structures, not only challenges researchers in identifying the essential elements of the experience but also makes it difficult for proponents of supernatural explanations to substantiate their claims. Furthermore, the difficulty in determining the precise timing of NDEs—often dependent on verifying so-called out-of-body observations—poses a potential challenge for advocates of supernatural explanations. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78175_d58892501363fc735d3c12592162e3c2.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Studies on the Core of Religion Leading to the De-identification of Religion Studies on the Core of Religion Leading to the De-identification of Religion 19 38 78055 10.30497/prr.2026.247923.1988 FA Alireza Shojaeizand Associate Professor, Department of Sociology, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-9862-2016 Journal Article 2025 03 08 Study on the core of religion can be considered one of the necessary and beneficial steps in the direction of subject identification. A movement that, if continued and placed on the right path, could be effective in moderating and correcting the prevailing reductionist approaches and help to repair and strengthen various fields of study of religion. However, this endeavor, stemming from its roots in Christianity and modern West, took a course that was at odds with its original purposes. Rather than distinguishing it from similar categories and emphasizing the aspects of distinction, it promoted the de-identification of religions. Continuing this trend not only deprives objectivity from studies of religion, but also disregards the significant distinctions among religions, leading to the weakening and eventual extinction of the knowledge that it has fed on and from which it has gained its credibility. Another consequence of persisting in this trend is a change in purposes, moving from a position of <em>understanding religion</em> to a kind of <em>constructing religion</em>. Study on the core of religion can be considered one of the necessary and beneficial steps in the direction of subject identification. A movement that, if continued and placed on the right path, could be effective in moderating and correcting the prevailing reductionist approaches and help to repair and strengthen various fields of study of religion. However, this endeavor, stemming from its roots in Christianity and modern West, took a course that was at odds with its original purposes. Rather than distinguishing it from similar categories and emphasizing the aspects of distinction, it promoted the de-identification of religions. Continuing this trend not only deprives objectivity from studies of religion, but also disregards the significant distinctions among religions, leading to the weakening and eventual extinction of the knowledge that it has fed on and from which it has gained its credibility. Another consequence of persisting in this trend is a change in purposes, moving from a position of <em>understanding religion</em> to a kind of <em>constructing religion</em>. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78055_640105bca8a4f6a03586af718a3841a8.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Peter Berger's Perspective on the Crisis of the Meaning of Life in Modern Societies Peter Berger's Perspective on the Crisis of the Meaning of Life in Modern Societies 39 53 78174 10.30497/prr.2026.247371.1964 FA Mohammad Esmailzadeh Ph. D. Candidate in Cultural Sociology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0005-7604-5023 Hamed HajiHeidari Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0005-7604-5023 Journal Article 2024 12 07 The modern era has bestowed many gifts upon humanity, but with regard to the meaning of life, this optimism is questionable, and many sociologists have acknowledged the contrary. This article specifically examines Peter Berger's perspective on the crisis of the meaning of life in modern societies. The research method employed is interpretative textualism, inspired by John Plamenatz. The main findings of this study indicate that Berger's perspective on the crisis of meaning in modern societies evolves through three distinct phases, with his third view demonstrating greater coherence and comprehensiveness than his first two. Based on the formulation derived from his perspective, he initially identified secularization, and subsequently pluralization, as the cause of the crisis of meaning in modern societies. In his third view, he integrated his first perspective with the second, arguing that within a context of secularization, the pluralization of thought becomes possible, and the crisis of meaning in modern societies is explained by such conditions. The modern era has bestowed many gifts upon humanity, but with regard to the meaning of life, this optimism is questionable, and many sociologists have acknowledged the contrary. This article specifically examines Peter Berger's perspective on the crisis of the meaning of life in modern societies. The research method employed is interpretative textualism, inspired by John Plamenatz. The main findings of this study indicate that Berger's perspective on the crisis of meaning in modern societies evolves through three distinct phases, with his third view demonstrating greater coherence and comprehensiveness than his first two. Based on the formulation derived from his perspective, he initially identified secularization, and subsequently pluralization, as the cause of the crisis of meaning in modern societies. In his third view, he integrated his first perspective with the second, arguing that within a context of secularization, the pluralization of thought becomes possible, and the crisis of meaning in modern societies is explained by such conditions. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78174_d992311c8dd8c263101effc1d881ab4f.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Kant and the Problem of the Meaning of Life Kant and the Problem of the Meaning of Life 55 71 78054 10.30497/prr.2026.247859.1983 FA Ghazaleh Hojjati Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, International University of Islamic Denominations, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0002-6039-4681 Journal Article 2025 02 24 In Kant's ethical theory, the meaning of life lies in fulfilling moral duties, following rational principles, and respecting the categorical imperative. Kant believes that a moral life is inherently meaningful, and the ultimate goal of human beings should be the realization of justice, freedom, and respect for moral values. He emphasizes that the meaning of life is not found in the pursuit of individual happiness, but in the effort to act according to moral and rational principles. Kant introduces the concept of practical reason as the human ability to act based on moral principles, which enables an individual not only to understand what is right but also to act accordingly. He also stresses the importance of the good will as the foundation of morality, a will that acts out of duty and moral principles, rather than personal outcomes or self-interest. Kant presents the categorical imperative as a guide for moral action, according to which every action must be such that it could be accepted as a universal law for all. Furthermore, he emphasizes human autonomy and freedom, which allow individuals to make decisions based on reason and moral principles. Ultimately, Kant regards the supreme good as the ultimate goal of life, a combination of virtue and happiness. For him, a meaningful life is achieved when individuals act according to moral principles and strive toward the realization of the supreme good. In Kant's ethical theory, the meaning of life lies in fulfilling moral duties, following rational principles, and respecting the categorical imperative. Kant believes that a moral life is inherently meaningful, and the ultimate goal of human beings should be the realization of justice, freedom, and respect for moral values. He emphasizes that the meaning of life is not found in the pursuit of individual happiness, but in the effort to act according to moral and rational principles. Kant introduces the concept of practical reason as the human ability to act based on moral principles, which enables an individual not only to understand what is right but also to act accordingly. He also stresses the importance of the good will as the foundation of morality, a will that acts out of duty and moral principles, rather than personal outcomes or self-interest. Kant presents the categorical imperative as a guide for moral action, according to which every action must be such that it could be accepted as a universal law for all. Furthermore, he emphasizes human autonomy and freedom, which allow individuals to make decisions based on reason and moral principles. Ultimately, Kant regards the supreme good as the ultimate goal of life, a combination of virtue and happiness. For him, a meaningful life is achieved when individuals act according to moral principles and strive toward the realization of the supreme good. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78054_a22d9204f4af59e9d8f1dbb2aca4b150.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Emil Fackenheim and the Reinterpretation of Jewish Theology in Light of the Holocaust: An Analysis and Critique Emil Fackenheim and the Reinterpretation of Jewish Theology in Light of the Holocaust: An Analysis and Critique 73 92 78179 10.30497/prr.2026.248605.2027 FA Milad Azami Maram Assistant Professor, Department of Comparative Religions and Mysticism, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0006-5610-7255 Alireza Moayyed Rad Master’s Student in Comparative Religions and Mysticism, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0003-0570-2183 Journal Article 2025 07 20 Emil Fackenheim, one of the most prominent post-Holocaust theologians, endeavored to reconstruct Jewish theology in light of the Holocaust. According to the authors' analysis, his theological reconstruction revolved around five central tenets: the presence or absence of God, evil and theodicy, the biblical covenant, the meaning of history, and the possibility of faith's survival. Fackenheim considered the Holocaust to be a “demonic” evil and deemed traditional theodicies inadequate. In his view, from the ashes of Auschwitz, a "commanding voice" is heard, calling upon Jews to uphold the "614th Commandment." Therefore, Jews are invited to respond responsibly to atrocities and "epoch-making events," and thus must abandon the passivity of awaiting a future messianic age. This theological analysis leads Fackenheim to a politico-religious imperative: since the Holocaust was a product of the historical powerlessness of the Jews and the lack of support from other nations, the establishment of the State of Israel is not merely a political choice but a religious duty and the primary instrument for "Tikkun Olam" (repairing the world) and the survival of Jewish identity. Fackenheim not only supports the establishment of the State of Israel but, in a way, bestows upon it necessity and sanctity. This political theology, however, faces fundamental critiques, including: reliance on the shaky foundations of an argument, the uncritical sanctification of an earthly state, and most importantly, the creation of a "moral blind spot" that, by focusing on the historical suffering of Jews, fails to see the present suffering of Palestinians. Emil Fackenheim, one of the most prominent post-Holocaust theologians, endeavored to reconstruct Jewish theology in light of the Holocaust. According to the authors' analysis, his theological reconstruction revolved around five central tenets: the presence or absence of God, evil and theodicy, the biblical covenant, the meaning of history, and the possibility of faith's survival. Fackenheim considered the Holocaust to be a “demonic” evil and deemed traditional theodicies inadequate. In his view, from the ashes of Auschwitz, a "commanding voice" is heard, calling upon Jews to uphold the "614th Commandment." Therefore, Jews are invited to respond responsibly to atrocities and "epoch-making events," and thus must abandon the passivity of awaiting a future messianic age. This theological analysis leads Fackenheim to a politico-religious imperative: since the Holocaust was a product of the historical powerlessness of the Jews and the lack of support from other nations, the establishment of the State of Israel is not merely a political choice but a religious duty and the primary instrument for "Tikkun Olam" (repairing the world) and the survival of Jewish identity. Fackenheim not only supports the establishment of the State of Israel but, in a way, bestows upon it necessity and sanctity. This political theology, however, faces fundamental critiques, including: reliance on the shaky foundations of an argument, the uncritical sanctification of an earthly state, and most importantly, the creation of a "moral blind spot" that, by focusing on the historical suffering of Jews, fails to see the present suffering of Palestinians. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78179_cda9f08049acc2dfe0842ce0f2f08774.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Explicating a Composite Theodicy in the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani: The Case of Mohammad Hossein Assar Explicating a Composite Theodicy in the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani: The Case of Mohammad Hossein Assar 93 108 78178 10.30497/prr.2026.248287.2014 FA Mohammd-Hossein Kolahi Ph.D. Candidate in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-8472-4126 Journal Article 2025 05 18 This paper presents a critical exposition of the theodicy of natural evil as formulated by Mohammad Hossein Assar, a prominent contemporary thinker within the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani. Assar constructs a theological framework that deliberately eschews the ontological foundations of Sadrian philosophy. The cornerstone of his argument is a radical semantic and ontological redefinition of "natural" versus "moral" evil. He delineates a tripartite typology—purely natural, purely moral, and hybrid—whereby he defines purely natural evil as an axiologically neutral, ontic (<em>takwīnī</em>) event. This re-conceptualization allows him to assert that the divine creation of such phenomena is entirely consistent with God’s benevolence. Assar’s solution culminates in a composite theodicy integrating three distinct strands of thought. At its core is a "Hidden Reasons" theodicy, which posits that the ultimate divine wisdom (<em>ḥikma</em>) behind natural suffering remains largely inaccessible to human cognition, apart from that which God reveals. This foundation is augmented by, first, an extended Libertarian framework that uniquely implicates creaturely free will in the genesis of all natural evils, and second, a doctrine of "Conditional Divine Benevolence," which contends that God’s goodwill is not universally or unconditionally bestowed upon all humankind. This paper presents a critical exposition of the theodicy of natural evil as formulated by Mohammad Hossein Assar, a prominent contemporary thinker within the School of Mirza Mahdi Isfahani. Assar constructs a theological framework that deliberately eschews the ontological foundations of Sadrian philosophy. The cornerstone of his argument is a radical semantic and ontological redefinition of "natural" versus "moral" evil. He delineates a tripartite typology—purely natural, purely moral, and hybrid—whereby he defines purely natural evil as an axiologically neutral, ontic (<em>takwīnī</em>) event. This re-conceptualization allows him to assert that the divine creation of such phenomena is entirely consistent with God’s benevolence. Assar’s solution culminates in a composite theodicy integrating three distinct strands of thought. At its core is a "Hidden Reasons" theodicy, which posits that the ultimate divine wisdom (<em>ḥikma</em>) behind natural suffering remains largely inaccessible to human cognition, apart from that which God reveals. This foundation is augmented by, first, an extended Libertarian framework that uniquely implicates creaturely free will in the genesis of all natural evils, and second, a doctrine of "Conditional Divine Benevolence," which contends that God’s goodwill is not universally or unconditionally bestowed upon all humankind. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78178_3d00b84e55ba73b301b990158d9c5329.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 The Relation of Human Will to Causality and Divine Knowledge: A New Explanation of the Problem of Free Will The Relation of Human Will to Causality and Divine Knowledge: A New Explanation of the Problem of Free Will 109 125 78176 10.30497/prr.2026.248062.2001 FA Hosein Souzanchi Professor, Department of Social Sciences, University of Baqir al-Olum, Qom, Iran. 0000-0003-1733-3138 Journal Article 2025 04 14 The common solution in Islamic philosophy to the problem of free will is of the kind that, while accepting the generality of causal necessity and God's eternal knowledge, seeks to find a place for human will (al-irāda). However, in this solution, the "Best of All Possible Worlds" (<em>al-niẓām al-aḥsan</em>) is reduced to the "only possible world", as if a confusion has arisen between God's knowledge and His wisdom, and the scope of God's power is constrained. Moreover, in this model, the explanation of will in human beings does not differ significantly from the explanation of will in animals. In the present paper, employing the method of philosophical analysis and taking as its foundation the theory of "the extensiveness of reality beyond existence" (accepting reality for possible worlds), and by providing a ground for accepting preference based on priority (<em>awlawiyya</em>) instead of necessity (<em>ḍarūra</em>), a different conception of the Best of All Possible Worlds is presented. This conception, while taking seriously the fundamental difference between human beings and other creatures, explains human free will in such a way that, while accepting the principle "a thing, as long as it is not necessary, does not come into existence" (<em>al-shayʾ mā lam yajib lam yūjad</em>) within each possible world, and negating its applicability to specifically human acts of willing, it becomes possible to defend the existence of various options before the human being and the possibility of choosing among them. This new explanation of the problem of free will, in addition to being immune to the objections raised against previous solutions, is also capable of resolving certain difficulties such as the problem of <em>badāʾ</em>. The common solution in Islamic philosophy to the problem of free will is of the kind that, while accepting the generality of causal necessity and God's eternal knowledge, seeks to find a place for human will (al-irāda). However, in this solution, the "Best of All Possible Worlds" (<em>al-niẓām al-aḥsan</em>) is reduced to the "only possible world", as if a confusion has arisen between God's knowledge and His wisdom, and the scope of God's power is constrained. Moreover, in this model, the explanation of will in human beings does not differ significantly from the explanation of will in animals. In the present paper, employing the method of philosophical analysis and taking as its foundation the theory of "the extensiveness of reality beyond existence" (accepting reality for possible worlds), and by providing a ground for accepting preference based on priority (<em>awlawiyya</em>) instead of necessity (<em>ḍarūra</em>), a different conception of the Best of All Possible Worlds is presented. This conception, while taking seriously the fundamental difference between human beings and other creatures, explains human free will in such a way that, while accepting the principle "a thing, as long as it is not necessary, does not come into existence" (<em>al-shayʾ mā lam yajib lam yūjad</em>) within each possible world, and negating its applicability to specifically human acts of willing, it becomes possible to defend the existence of various options before the human being and the possibility of choosing among them. This new explanation of the problem of free will, in addition to being immune to the objections raised against previous solutions, is also capable of resolving certain difficulties such as the problem of <em>badāʾ</em>. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78176_8dac70a5eb69233e7fa4af5d782fa115.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Cognitive Explanation of the Problem of Evil: The Role of Cognitive Science in Enriching the Philosophical Dialogue Cognitive Explanation of the Problem of Evil: The Role of Cognitive Science in Enriching the Philosophical Dialogue 127 142 78181 10.30497/prr.2026.248991.2043 FA Eisa Mohammadinia Assistant Professor, Department of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, University of Mazandaran, Babolsar, Iran. 0009-0000-9548-2011 Journal Article 2025 09 20 The problem of evil, as a fundamental normative challenge in the philosophy of religion, argues that the existence of evils in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent God is paradoxical. This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach to explore the capacities of cognitive science in providing a psychological explanation of the problem of evil. The central research question is: how can cognitive science enhance our understanding of the formation and persistence of the problem of evil in the human mind, and what is the relationship between this psychological explanation and the philosophical response to the normative challenge of evil? The findings, presented through a systematic "four-level explanation," demonstrate that cognitive science—by identifying and analyzing underlying cognitive-affective mechanisms such as the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), Theory of Mind (ToM), the affective empathy system, and cognitive biases (e.g., the Just-World Hypothesis and Hindsight Bias)—can offer a comprehensive account of the process through which evil becomes a "problem." This four-level analysis—encompassing the levels of basic cognitive architecture, the dynamic interaction of mechanisms, the psychological function of theodicies, and individual differences—reveals that the paradoxical perception of evil results from the complex interplay of these mechanisms within the architecture of the human mind. Distinguishing between the psychological appeal and the philosophical validity of theodicies is a key achievement of this research, opening new horizons for critiquing and evaluating philosophical arguments. Consequently, cognitive science, by serving as a bridge between the realms of description and justification, enriches the philosophical dialogue on evil. The problem of evil, as a fundamental normative challenge in the philosophy of religion, argues that the existence of evils in a world created by an omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly benevolent God is paradoxical. This paper adopts an interdisciplinary approach to explore the capacities of cognitive science in providing a psychological explanation of the problem of evil. The central research question is: how can cognitive science enhance our understanding of the formation and persistence of the problem of evil in the human mind, and what is the relationship between this psychological explanation and the philosophical response to the normative challenge of evil? The findings, presented through a systematic "four-level explanation," demonstrate that cognitive science—by identifying and analyzing underlying cognitive-affective mechanisms such as the Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD), Theory of Mind (ToM), the affective empathy system, and cognitive biases (e.g., the Just-World Hypothesis and Hindsight Bias)—can offer a comprehensive account of the process through which evil becomes a "problem." This four-level analysis—encompassing the levels of basic cognitive architecture, the dynamic interaction of mechanisms, the psychological function of theodicies, and individual differences—reveals that the paradoxical perception of evil results from the complex interplay of these mechanisms within the architecture of the human mind. Distinguishing between the psychological appeal and the philosophical validity of theodicies is a key achievement of this research, opening new horizons for critiquing and evaluating philosophical arguments. Consequently, cognitive science, by serving as a bridge between the realms of description and justification, enriches the philosophical dialogue on evil. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78181_7d35e53ceb12ae2c3ade1876af60ee3e.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 06 07 Divine Action in a Lawful World: Why Dispositional Essentialism Is the Middle Way Divine Action in a Lawful World: Why Dispositional Essentialism Is the Middle Way 143 160 78180 10.30497/prr.2026.248936.2041 FA Ebrahim Azadegan Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy of Science, Sharif University of Technology, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-5639-0448 Javad Darvish Aghajani Assistant Professor, Department of Science and Religion, Institute for Science and Technology Studies, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0003-0915-4471 Journal Article 2025 09 11 This paper begins with the question of which image of “the law of nature”, namely Humean regularism, nomological necessitarianism of Armstrong, or Dispositional Essentialism, provides the most coherent framework for explicating “special divine action” without undermining scientific realism or theological concerns. Our argument rests on two criteria sets. At the level of the metaphysics of science, we discuss the distinction between laws and accidental generalizations, the warranted reliance on counterfactuals, and testability; and at the level of theology, we address the preservation of divine agency and wisdom, the independence of natural causes, the distinction between general and particular divine action, and the management of the problem of evil. Relying on this framework, we show that regularity-based views incline toward occacionalism and undermine scientific realism, while Armstrong’s necessitarianism risks dragging theology between deism and an incoherent interventionism. These deficiencies are fundamental and irremediable. By contrast, the paper defends dispositional essentialism. In this way, divine action can be understood as “fine tuning conditions” rather than contravening the law. Reading Cartwright's capacity-centered approach, the ceteris paribus clause is transformed from a weakening caveat into an explanatory condition for the manifestation of capacities. And with the Handfield's model of a “law-abiding miracle,” the uniqueness of the miracle is preserved without breaking the law. Concerning the problem of evil, this theory clears it of extraneous metaphysical puzzles and offers a more precise formulation for theological reflection. The final result is that an enhanced dispositional essentialism provides a single framework for the coexistence of divine action and natural causes. This paper begins with the question of which image of “the law of nature”, namely Humean regularism, nomological necessitarianism of Armstrong, or Dispositional Essentialism, provides the most coherent framework for explicating “special divine action” without undermining scientific realism or theological concerns. Our argument rests on two criteria sets. At the level of the metaphysics of science, we discuss the distinction between laws and accidental generalizations, the warranted reliance on counterfactuals, and testability; and at the level of theology, we address the preservation of divine agency and wisdom, the independence of natural causes, the distinction between general and particular divine action, and the management of the problem of evil. Relying on this framework, we show that regularity-based views incline toward occacionalism and undermine scientific realism, while Armstrong’s necessitarianism risks dragging theology between deism and an incoherent interventionism. These deficiencies are fundamental and irremediable. By contrast, the paper defends dispositional essentialism. In this way, divine action can be understood as “fine tuning conditions” rather than contravening the law. Reading Cartwright's capacity-centered approach, the ceteris paribus clause is transformed from a weakening caveat into an explanatory condition for the manifestation of capacities. And with the Handfield's model of a “law-abiding miracle,” the uniqueness of the miracle is preserved without breaking the law. Concerning the problem of evil, this theory clears it of extraneous metaphysical puzzles and offers a more precise formulation for theological reflection. The final result is that an enhanced dispositional essentialism provides a single framework for the coexistence of divine action and natural causes. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78180_56034f6bcbf6e2980e81aefa9cb88305.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Feminist Rhetorical Hermeneutics in Understanding Biblical Texts from the Perspective of Phyllis Trible Feminist Rhetorical Hermeneutics in Understanding Biblical Texts from the Perspective of Phyllis Trible 161 176 78177 10.30497/prr.2026.248149.2008 FA Zahra Sharif Assistant Professor, Department of Theoretical Foundations of Gender, Women and Family Research Institute, Qom. Iran. 0000-0002-2986-246X Journal Article 2025 04 27 Phyllis Trible, a feminist scholar of biblical texts, believes that a rhetorical hermeneutical approach to biblical texts can inspire women and pave the way for the reconstruction of a biblical theology. In her view, the biblical text interprets itself, and in this self-disclosure, it possesses an internal hermeneutic that allows for multiple possibilities of reading. The clues by which an interpreter can determine which meaning to adopt in order to attain a coherent understanding of the biblical text are identifiable within the text itself. For Trible, these clues are the metaphors, stories, imagery, and central themes of the Bible, by reference to which one must resolve the internal contradictions of the text. The biblical texts depict two conditions for women: subordination and equality. By appealing to the metaphor of the womb, the creation story of man and woman, the imagery of humanity being created in the image of ‘ha-adam’, the recovery of the stories of significant women in the Bible, and similar elements, Trible identifies the equality approach as the primary reading. In her interpretation of the passages concerning the subordination of women, she considers them to belong to the period after sin and the expulsion from the Garden. This state was not part of God’s original design and is viewed as an inauthentic condition from which woman and man, by overcoming sin and “disobeying disobedience,” must emerge to become co-equal companions and, together, the image of God. She considers the God of the Old and New Testaments to be one, and uses the Hebrew language as the primary source for understanding the biblical texts. Phyllis Trible, a feminist scholar of biblical texts, believes that a rhetorical hermeneutical approach to biblical texts can inspire women and pave the way for the reconstruction of a biblical theology. In her view, the biblical text interprets itself, and in this self-disclosure, it possesses an internal hermeneutic that allows for multiple possibilities of reading. The clues by which an interpreter can determine which meaning to adopt in order to attain a coherent understanding of the biblical text are identifiable within the text itself. For Trible, these clues are the metaphors, stories, imagery, and central themes of the Bible, by reference to which one must resolve the internal contradictions of the text. The biblical texts depict two conditions for women: subordination and equality. By appealing to the metaphor of the womb, the creation story of man and woman, the imagery of humanity being created in the image of ‘ha-adam’, the recovery of the stories of significant women in the Bible, and similar elements, Trible identifies the equality approach as the primary reading. In her interpretation of the passages concerning the subordination of women, she considers them to belong to the period after sin and the expulsion from the Garden. This state was not part of God’s original design and is viewed as an inauthentic condition from which woman and man, by overcoming sin and “disobeying disobedience,” must emerge to become co-equal companions and, together, the image of God. She considers the God of the Old and New Testaments to be one, and uses the Hebrew language as the primary source for understanding the biblical texts. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78177_3aa4cb2017fe681acd92bbea6b9f6015.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Evaluation of the Presuppositions of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness from the Perspective of Islamic Thought Evaluation of the Presuppositions of the Problem of Divine Hiddenness from the Perspective of Islamic Thought 177 193 78183 10.30497/prr.2026.249493.2079 FA Hamidreza Ayatollahy . Professor Emeritus, Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0002-3454-0174 Journal Article 2025 11 21 Schellenberg has claimed that if there is a God, His love must be manifested to all humans. But many humans do not find a manifestation of this love. The existence of such non-resistant atheists shows that such a God does not exist. In this article, to evaluate Schellenberg's claim, it has been shown that the structure of his argument is based on four assumptions, the correctness of which in the context of Islamic thought is seriously questionable. The first assumption: God must be at the highest level in terms of love and to all humans. While in Islamic thought, God's love is only for those who love Him and not all humans. The second is that: God must reveal himself to seekers without motives or illness. The article shows that this revelation was made comprehensively through the sending of messengers. Third premise: There are people who sincerely seek to understand God and have a relationship with Him but have not achieved such knowledge. In this paper it will be shown that neither the sincerity of these people's efforts, nor the great effort of these people, nor the lack of evidence are acceptable, because the knowledge of the message of the prophets is widely accepted. Fourth premise: It is expected that there is sufficient evidence to know such a God. This premise shows that the atheist is looking for a specific type of evidence that can be a witness to the existence of God. The believer can claim, based on the Islamic vision, that there are sufficient and numerous evidences for the existence of God that the atheist can achieve if he changes his expectations. As a result, these assumptions cannot be a prelude to Schellenberg's arguments. Therefore, the structure of his argument based on Islamic views collapses. Schellenberg has claimed that if there is a God, His love must be manifested to all humans. But many humans do not find a manifestation of this love. The existence of such non-resistant atheists shows that such a God does not exist. In this article, to evaluate Schellenberg's claim, it has been shown that the structure of his argument is based on four assumptions, the correctness of which in the context of Islamic thought is seriously questionable. The first assumption: God must be at the highest level in terms of love and to all humans. While in Islamic thought, God's love is only for those who love Him and not all humans. The second is that: God must reveal himself to seekers without motives or illness. The article shows that this revelation was made comprehensively through the sending of messengers. Third premise: There are people who sincerely seek to understand God and have a relationship with Him but have not achieved such knowledge. In this paper it will be shown that neither the sincerity of these people's efforts, nor the great effort of these people, nor the lack of evidence are acceptable, because the knowledge of the message of the prophets is widely accepted. Fourth premise: It is expected that there is sufficient evidence to know such a God. This premise shows that the atheist is looking for a specific type of evidence that can be a witness to the existence of God. The believer can claim, based on the Islamic vision, that there are sufficient and numerous evidences for the existence of God that the atheist can achieve if he changes his expectations. As a result, these assumptions cannot be a prelude to Schellenberg's arguments. Therefore, the structure of his argument based on Islamic views collapses. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78183_e13974a8841f950c46d11ee4d33a67ea.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 Kant's Pre-Critical Possibility Proof for God's Existence as the Ground of Possibility: A Reconstruction Kant's Pre-Critical Possibility Proof for God's Existence as the Ground of Possibility: A Reconstruction 195 213 78182 10.30497/prr.2026.249352.2069 FA Ahmad Ebrahimzadeh Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0009-7975-3075 Mustafa Zali Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0002-0953-9657 Journal Article 2025 11 05 The aim of this paper is to analyze and reconstruct Kant’s possibility proof. By distinguishing real possibility from logical possibility and by appealing to the notion of real absolute necessity, this proof introduces God as the unique necessary being who serves as the ground of all possibilities and who exists with real absolute necessity. The argument is significant both from a historical perspective and in virtue of its implications for modal metaphysics, particularly with respect to the problem of the ground of possibilities and the truthmakers of modal propositions. As such, it has recently received renewed attention in contemporary Kant scholarship. After presenting the conceptual preliminaries, the present study examines four main steps of the possibility proof, following the interpretations and reconstructions developed within contemporary Kant scholarship<span dir="RTL" lang="FA">:</span> (1) the necessity of the existence of a ground for real possibilities; (2) the transition from <em>de dicto</em> necessity to <em>de re</em> necessity (that is, the existence of a necessary being); (3) the demonstration of the uniqueness of this ground; and (4) its simplicity. At each stage, the argument is given a logical reconstruction, the main challenges confronting it are identified, and a number of critical remarks and proposals are offered with a view to refining or revising the formulation and addressing these challenges. In the final section, by presenting a preferred reconstruction of the possibility proof, it is argued that the overall structure of the argument can be rendered shorter and more rigorous in a two-step form, while preserving its core content: The first step is to move toward finding at least one ground for some possibilities, and the second step is to claim that any ground for some real possibilities is a ground for all real possibilities, and therefore there exists one ground for all real possibilities. The aim of this paper is to analyze and reconstruct Kant’s possibility proof. By distinguishing real possibility from logical possibility and by appealing to the notion of real absolute necessity, this proof introduces God as the unique necessary being who serves as the ground of all possibilities and who exists with real absolute necessity. The argument is significant both from a historical perspective and in virtue of its implications for modal metaphysics, particularly with respect to the problem of the ground of possibilities and the truthmakers of modal propositions. As such, it has recently received renewed attention in contemporary Kant scholarship. After presenting the conceptual preliminaries, the present study examines four main steps of the possibility proof, following the interpretations and reconstructions developed within contemporary Kant scholarship<span dir="RTL" lang="FA">:</span> (1) the necessity of the existence of a ground for real possibilities; (2) the transition from <em>de dicto</em> necessity to <em>de re</em> necessity (that is, the existence of a necessary being); (3) the demonstration of the uniqueness of this ground; and (4) its simplicity. At each stage, the argument is given a logical reconstruction, the main challenges confronting it are identified, and a number of critical remarks and proposals are offered with a view to refining or revising the formulation and addressing these challenges. In the final section, by presenting a preferred reconstruction of the possibility proof, it is argued that the overall structure of the argument can be rendered shorter and more rigorous in a two-step form, while preserving its core content: The first step is to move toward finding at least one ground for some possibilities, and the second step is to claim that any ground for some real possibilities is a ground for all real possibilities, and therefore there exists one ground for all real possibilities. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78182_b52c65dd4dd62dc1ab054cccaa820f82.pdf