Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 The Place of Gnosis in the Ethical Theory of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli The Place of Gnosis in the Ethical Theory of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli 1 11 77636 10.30497/prr.2025.244492.1832 FA Hosein Ahmadi Associate Professor, Department of Moral Philosophy, Research Center of Encyclopedia of Islamic Intellectual Sciences, Imam Khomeini Educational and Research Institute, Qom, Iran. 0000-0002-8209-1860 Journal Article 2023 05 06 The purpose of ethics is one of the fundamental topics in moral philosophy, and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has also addressed this issue. This study, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines his perspective on the subject. According to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, gnosis (ma‘rifa) of divine truths constitutes the happiness (sa‘āda) of theoretical reason, while the happiness of practical reason lies in servitude (‘ubūdiyya) to God. Therefore, gnosis alone cannot be regarded as the sole factor in attaining happiness. Based on a semantic analysis of knowledge (‘ilm) and gnosis, and their distinction, he rejects the idea of God as a mere object of knowledge (ma‘lūm) and instead affirms His status as the object of gnosis (ma‘rūf). Thus, he assigns greater significance to gnosis over knowledge, particularly intuitive gnosis (al-ma‘rifa al-shuhūdīyya*), which he considers to have a stronger impact on achieving happiness. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli classifies knowledge into three levels: knowledge of certainty (‘ilm al-yaqīn), vision of certainty (‘ayn al-yaqīn), and reality of certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn). He defines knowledge of certainty as certain gnosis attained through acquired knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī), while vision of certainty, and reality of certainty belong to the domain of intuitive gnosis. In evaluating Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's perspective, it appears that cognition and inclination are the two primary factors in attaining happiness. Given its unique characteristics, intuitive gnosis can encompass both cognitive and inclinational dimensions in human beings. The extent to which an individual attains intuitive gnosis of God, corresponding to their existential capacity, determines the degree of their ultimate happiness. The purpose of ethics is one of the fundamental topics in moral philosophy, and Ayatollah Javadi Amoli has also addressed this issue. This study, using a descriptive-analytical method, examines his perspective on the subject. According to Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, gnosis (ma‘rifa) of divine truths constitutes the happiness (sa‘āda) of theoretical reason, while the happiness of practical reason lies in servitude (‘ubūdiyya) to God. Therefore, gnosis alone cannot be regarded as the sole factor in attaining happiness. Based on a semantic analysis of knowledge (‘ilm) and gnosis, and their distinction, he rejects the idea of God as a mere object of knowledge (ma‘lūm) and instead affirms His status as the object of gnosis (ma‘rūf). Thus, he assigns greater significance to gnosis over knowledge, particularly intuitive gnosis (al-ma‘rifa al-shuhūdīyya*), which he considers to have a stronger impact on achieving happiness. Ayatollah Javadi Amoli classifies knowledge into three levels: knowledge of certainty (‘ilm al-yaqīn), vision of certainty (‘ayn al-yaqīn), and reality of certainty (ḥaqq al-yaqīn). He defines knowledge of certainty as certain gnosis attained through acquired knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ḥuṣūlī), while vision of certainty, and reality of certainty belong to the domain of intuitive gnosis. In evaluating Ayatollah Javadi Amoli's perspective, it appears that cognition and inclination are the two primary factors in attaining happiness. Given its unique characteristics, intuitive gnosis can encompass both cognitive and inclinational dimensions in human beings. The extent to which an individual attains intuitive gnosis of God, corresponding to their existential capacity, determines the degree of their ultimate happiness.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77636_97daf1e340d0f9203d63924f967641ce.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 A New Interpretation of Bodily Resurrection in Islamic Philosophy Inspired by Functionalism in the Philosophy of Mind A New Interpretation of Bodily Resurrection in Islamic Philosophy Inspired by Functionalism in the Philosophy of Mind 13 30 77637 10.30497/prr.2025.246336.1918 FA Seyed Taha Baqizadeh Bafqi Ph.D. Candidate of Philosophy and Kalam, Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0008-6641-9919 Saeed Anvari Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0002-9402-880X Journal Article 2024 05 18 In Islamic philosophy, sensible objects are perceived indirectly, while what is perceived directly is the form that arises in common sense (Phantasia). Although Islamic philosophers differ on how forms arise in the common sense, they agree that the emergence of a form in the common sense is equivalent to sensory perception. They explain the sensory representation of supernatural beings on this basis, positing that, in a process inverse to the direct observation of material objects, an image from the unseen realm (rather than from the five material senses) is imprinted in the common sense, thereby allowing the supernatural being to be sensorily represented and perceived. On the other hand, according to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, sensory perception is defined as whatever fulfills the functional role of sensory perception. Since sensory experience without bodily mediation is identical to that which occurs through the body, the motivating factor for sensory perception can be non-corporeal. Thus, a human can, epistemologically speaking, have sensory and bodily perception without needing a material (corporeal) body. Consequently, a human can be considered capable of sensory perception even in a non-material realm, and for this reason, bodily resurrection remains meaningful. This is because the corporeality of resurrection lies in the human having a sensory experience of their body and bodily pleasures/pains on the Day of Judgment, rather than necessarily requiring a physical body or material realization. In Islamic philosophy, sensible objects are perceived indirectly, while what is perceived directly is the form that arises in common sense (Phantasia). Although Islamic philosophers differ on how forms arise in the common sense, they agree that the emergence of a form in the common sense is equivalent to sensory perception. They explain the sensory representation of supernatural beings on this basis, positing that, in a process inverse to the direct observation of material objects, an image from the unseen realm (rather than from the five material senses) is imprinted in the common sense, thereby allowing the supernatural being to be sensorily represented and perceived. On the other hand, according to functionalism in the philosophy of mind, sensory perception is defined as whatever fulfills the functional role of sensory perception. Since sensory experience without bodily mediation is identical to that which occurs through the body, the motivating factor for sensory perception can be non-corporeal. Thus, a human can, epistemologically speaking, have sensory and bodily perception without needing a material (corporeal) body. Consequently, a human can be considered capable of sensory perception even in a non-material realm, and for this reason, bodily resurrection remains meaningful. This is because the corporeality of resurrection lies in the human having a sensory experience of their body and bodily pleasures/pains on the Day of Judgment, rather than necessarily requiring a physical body or material realization.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77637_8d864daca124fe23e715076b02213121.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 The Impact of the Doctrine of Redemption in Catholicism on Mahmoud Ayoub's Theory of Redemptive Suffering in Islam The Impact of the Doctrine of Redemption in Catholicism on Mahmoud Ayoub's Theory of Redemptive Suffering in Islam 31 46 77639 10.30497/prr.2024.245542.1880 FA Mohammadmahdi Keshavarz Moraveji Ph.D. Graduate in Islamic Theology, Shahid Motahari University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-6333-8381 Christopher Paul Clohessy Professor, Pontifical Institute for Arabic and Islamic Studies (PISAI), Rome, Italy. 0009-0002-4929-9333 Rasoul Rasoulipour Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0002-3157-4715 Journal Article 2023 12 09 This paper investigates the impact of the doctrine of redemption in Catholic theology on Mahmoud Ayoub's theory of redemptive suffering in Islam. In this regard, we need to understand how Christian theological views of Jesus Christ’s redemptive work affected and inspired Ayoub, and how the Christian terminology in this area helps him to model his thoughts. Therefore, the main question of this research is: How has Ayoub’s model of Islamic redemption been inspired by Christian theological teachings? Then, three important realms in Christian teachings that have the possibility to inspire Ayoub in his theory, i.e. terminology, functionality, and the role of enduring suffering, will be studied. In the first realm, Ayoub’s definition of redemption does not fully adhere to the Judeo-Christian understanding, as he offers a broad definition to avoid potential conceptual challenges. In the second realm, as just as Christ liberates humanity from the slavery of sin, intercession in Ayoub’s theory, saves the sinners from punishment. As a result, despite differences between Islamic and Christian perspectives on sin classification, redemption in both faiths involves deliverance from sin. Finally, the third area claims that the sufferings of Jesus Christ and Imam Husayn have been a main source of inspiration for Ayoub’s theory of Redemptive Suffering in Islam, however, enduring suffering alone cannot lead to redemption. This paper investigates the impact of the doctrine of redemption in Catholic theology on Mahmoud Ayoub's theory of redemptive suffering in Islam. In this regard, we need to understand how Christian theological views of Jesus Christ’s redemptive work affected and inspired Ayoub, and how the Christian terminology in this area helps him to model his thoughts. Therefore, the main question of this research is: How has Ayoub’s model of Islamic redemption been inspired by Christian theological teachings? Then, three important realms in Christian teachings that have the possibility to inspire Ayoub in his theory, i.e. terminology, functionality, and the role of enduring suffering, will be studied. In the first realm, Ayoub’s definition of redemption does not fully adhere to the Judeo-Christian understanding, as he offers a broad definition to avoid potential conceptual challenges. In the second realm, as just as Christ liberates humanity from the slavery of sin, intercession in Ayoub’s theory, saves the sinners from punishment. As a result, despite differences between Islamic and Christian perspectives on sin classification, redemption in both faiths involves deliverance from sin. Finally, the third area claims that the sufferings of Jesus Christ and Imam Husayn have been a main source of inspiration for Ayoub’s theory of Redemptive Suffering in Islam, however, enduring suffering alone cannot lead to redemption.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77639_3b1c5c1af74b201c66819466f25f0c4b.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 A Sketch of Religious Philosophy in al-Farabi's Thought, Focusing on the Treatise Fī ʾAghrāḍ Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa A Sketch of Religious Philosophy in al-Farabi's Thought, Focusing on the Treatise Fī ʾAghrāḍ Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa 47 64 77640 10.30497/prr.2024.245196.1866 FA Seyyed Mohsen Hosseini Ph.D. Graduate in Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0002-0827-5976 Eynollah Khademi Professor, Department of Theology, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-6704-4014 Abdollah Salavati Professor, Department of Theology, Shahid Rajaee Teacher Training University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-6401-0003 Journal Article 2023 09 22 Al-Farabi’s philosophy represents an intelligent synthesis of select Qur’anic verses and references, certain elements of Greek philosophical heritage, and his own creative contributions. This form of composition predates al-Farabi and is known as “religious philosophy”. In this tradition, the doctrinal principles of each Abrahamic faith are assumed as foundational for their respective adherents, and then among philosophical teachings, those that do not contradict these foundational principles are integrated into a coherent religious-philosophical system. We argue that an early approach to religious philosophy within the Islamic intellectual tradition can be observed in al-Farabi’s treatise Fī ʾAghrāḍ Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (On the Aims of Metaphysics). In this work, he first identifies Allah as the absolute being (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq) and regards that branch of metaphysics which investigates the origin of existence as deserving the title of divine science. He then designates the primary subject of metaphysics as absolute being itself. From these two premises, al-Farabi concludes that divine science, in a sense, is identical to metaphysics. This interpretation led to a transformation of metaphysics into theology within the Islamic intellectual tradition. However, this does not mean that Allah became the sole subject of Islamic philosophy; rather, Allah—as the origin of existence—became its central axis, thereby integrating key theological concepts such as prophethood and resurrection into Islamic philosophical discourse. The second part of this study examines the influence of al-Farabi’s idea of religious philosophy on his other works. It demonstrates that some of his most significant treatises, including Al-Madīna al-Fāḍila, Al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya, and his treatises Al-Jam‘, Al-Milla, and Al- Ḥurūf, were composed with this philosophical-religious framework in mind. Al-Farabi’s philosophy represents an intelligent synthesis of select Qur’anic verses and references, certain elements of Greek philosophical heritage, and his own creative contributions. This form of composition predates al-Farabi and is known as “religious philosophy”. In this tradition, the doctrinal principles of each Abrahamic faith are assumed as foundational for their respective adherents, and then among philosophical teachings, those that do not contradict these foundational principles are integrated into a coherent religious-philosophical system. We argue that an early approach to religious philosophy within the Islamic intellectual tradition can be observed in al-Farabi’s treatise Fī ʾAghrāḍ Mā Baʿd al-Ṭabīʿa (On the Aims of Metaphysics). In this work, he first identifies Allah as the absolute being (al-mawjūd al-muṭlaq) and regards that branch of metaphysics which investigates the origin of existence as deserving the title of divine science. He then designates the primary subject of metaphysics as absolute being itself. From these two premises, al-Farabi concludes that divine science, in a sense, is identical to metaphysics. This interpretation led to a transformation of metaphysics into theology within the Islamic intellectual tradition. However, this does not mean that Allah became the sole subject of Islamic philosophy; rather, Allah—as the origin of existence—became its central axis, thereby integrating key theological concepts such as prophethood and resurrection into Islamic philosophical discourse. The second part of this study examines the influence of al-Farabi’s idea of religious philosophy on his other works. It demonstrates that some of his most significant treatises, including Al-Madīna al-Fāḍila, Al-Siyāsa al-Madaniyya, and his treatises Al-Jam‘, Al-Milla, and Al- Ḥurūf, were composed with this philosophical-religious framework in mind.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77640_32348fb0a2c17763acb4e425e1f11c24.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 Evidential Challenges of an Agnostic for Theists and Atheists Evidential Challenges of an Agnostic for Theists and Atheists 65 81 77641 10.30497/prr.2025.246524.1931 FA Gholamhossein Javadpoor Assistant Professor, Department of Kalam, The Iranian Research Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0006-2105-937X Journal Article 2024 06 19 Agnostics maintain that one cannot/should not arrive at either an affirmative or negative belief regarding the existence of God, and the correct epistemological approach on this matter is suspension of judgment. This approach typically emerges within an evidentialist framework, where the epistemic validity of a proposition depends on the proofs and supporting evidence. If the available evidence fails to decisively affirm or deny the proposition, then the appropriate response is silence. From the agnostic perspective, the theism/atheism dichotomy is problematic for three reasons: (1) Theistic and atheistic beliefs are neither presuppositions nor basic and self-justifying propositions; (2) There is insufficient evidence to support either position, and all purported evidence is flawed or invalid; (3) Even if the evidence is considered successful, the arguments on both sides ultimately balance out, leading to epistemic equivalence. Consequently, all epistemic paths lead to the suspension of judgment, and neither theism nor atheism can claim valid epistemic justification. However, the agnostic position may be excessively stringent. The wholesale rejection of all evidence and the claim that the arguments are perfectly balanced risk leading to a form of radical skepticism. Moreover, by refusing to acknowledge the approach of the believers, agnosticism disregards the rationality of theists and atheists alike, failing to recognize the intellectual virtues that may underlie their respective positions. Agnostics maintain that one cannot/should not arrive at either an affirmative or negative belief regarding the existence of God, and the correct epistemological approach on this matter is suspension of judgment. This approach typically emerges within an evidentialist framework, where the epistemic validity of a proposition depends on the proofs and supporting evidence. If the available evidence fails to decisively affirm or deny the proposition, then the appropriate response is silence. From the agnostic perspective, the theism/atheism dichotomy is problematic for three reasons: (1) Theistic and atheistic beliefs are neither presuppositions nor basic and self-justifying propositions; (2) There is insufficient evidence to support either position, and all purported evidence is flawed or invalid; (3) Even if the evidence is considered successful, the arguments on both sides ultimately balance out, leading to epistemic equivalence. Consequently, all epistemic paths lead to the suspension of judgment, and neither theism nor atheism can claim valid epistemic justification. However, the agnostic position may be excessively stringent. The wholesale rejection of all evidence and the claim that the arguments are perfectly balanced risk leading to a form of radical skepticism. Moreover, by refusing to acknowledge the approach of the believers, agnosticism disregards the rationality of theists and atheists alike, failing to recognize the intellectual virtues that may underlie their respective positions.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77641_23ea2eb8248f97b74d76f501d1d17acb.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 Inliteration of Islamic Revelation and the Idea of Divine Language Inliteration of Islamic Revelation and the Idea of Divine Language 83 100 77642 10.30497/prr.2025.246473.1927 FA Hamed Ghadiri Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy of Religion, University of Religions and Denominations, Qom, Iran. 0000-0001-9522-985X Journal Article 2024 06 09 In comparative theology, some scholars have drawn an analogy between the person of Christ and the Qur’an, suggesting that both possess a divine nature—Christ through incarnation and the Qur’an through inliteration. However, just as the doctrine of incarnation struggles to explain how the infinite can be present in the finite, this analogy raises a corresponding challenge for inliteration. Assuming the validity of this comparison, this paper explores whether a resolution to this challenge is possible. One potential response is the “idea of divine language,” which posits that language itself originates in the divine realm. This view could explain how the Qur’an, as the Word of God, can be fully divine while existing in linguistic form, since the linguistic form itself is divine. However, this solution does not extend to incarnation, which involves the presentation of the infinite in matter. Nevertheless, the idea of divine language faces two significant objections: firstly, it leads to the incomprehensibility of revelation; secondly, it faces historical-phenomenological implausibility. In comparative theology, some scholars have drawn an analogy between the person of Christ and the Qur’an, suggesting that both possess a divine nature—Christ through incarnation and the Qur’an through inliteration. However, just as the doctrine of incarnation struggles to explain how the infinite can be present in the finite, this analogy raises a corresponding challenge for inliteration. Assuming the validity of this comparison, this paper explores whether a resolution to this challenge is possible. One potential response is the “idea of divine language,” which posits that language itself originates in the divine realm. This view could explain how the Qur’an, as the Word of God, can be fully divine while existing in linguistic form, since the linguistic form itself is divine. However, this solution does not extend to incarnation, which involves the presentation of the infinite in matter. Nevertheless, the idea of divine language faces two significant objections: firstly, it leads to the incomprehensibility of revelation; secondly, it faces historical-phenomenological implausibility.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77642_d56bb4d7a5383889a688cc74a2e80795.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 The Influence of Swedenborgian Experiences on Kant's Thought The Influence of Swedenborgian Experiences on Kant's Thought 101 122 77656 10.30497/prr.2024.246374.1921 FA Omidreza Janbaz Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, Yasouj University, Yasouj, Iran 0000-0002-0431-554X Mahdi Shojaian Fard M.A. Student of Philosophical Logic, Department of Philosophy and Logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0000-8893-8607 Journal Article 2024 05 25 The conventional interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy, which emphasizes his response to Hume's empiricism and delineates the limits of knowledge, overlooks this crucial point that Kant's entire thought cannot be fully examined without considering his concern for conceptualizing the noumenal world and its relation to the phenomenal world. Contrary to the tenets of the Enlightenment, Kant grappled with Swedenborg's mystical experiences, realizing that the phenomenal indeterminacy of the object of such experiences does not negate their possibility of existence and significance. This recognition compelled Kant to integrate the formulation of the noumenal world and its connection to the phenomenal world within his critical system. Despite strong denials, one could argue that the influence of Swedenborg's thought on the overall structure and some of Kant's ideas and concepts is notable enough to raise questions about the similarities between his system and that of the great Swedish mystic. This inquiry, using a hermeneutic approach, invokes Swedenborgian teachings, concepts, and terminologies in comparison with elements of critical philosophy, highlighting both similarities and differences. Among the notable similarities are the distinctions and correlations between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, the subjectivity of the concepts of space and time, the proportionality of actions to the moral law as a primary condition for attaining the highest good, and the concept of the kingdom of ends. While these parallels may reflect the depth of the influence of Swedenborgian experiences on the Kantian system or the possibility of a shared origin, they do not undermine the originality of Kant's philosophy. The conventional interpretation of Kant's critical philosophy, which emphasizes his response to Hume's empiricism and delineates the limits of knowledge, overlooks this crucial point that Kant's entire thought cannot be fully examined without considering his concern for conceptualizing the noumenal world and its relation to the phenomenal world. Contrary to the tenets of the Enlightenment, Kant grappled with Swedenborg's mystical experiences, realizing that the phenomenal indeterminacy of the object of such experiences does not negate their possibility of existence and significance. This recognition compelled Kant to integrate the formulation of the noumenal world and its connection to the phenomenal world within his critical system. Despite strong denials, one could argue that the influence of Swedenborg's thought on the overall structure and some of Kant's ideas and concepts is notable enough to raise questions about the similarities between his system and that of the great Swedish mystic. This inquiry, using a hermeneutic approach, invokes Swedenborgian teachings, concepts, and terminologies in comparison with elements of critical philosophy, highlighting both similarities and differences. Among the notable similarities are the distinctions and correlations between the phenomenal and noumenal worlds, the subjectivity of the concepts of space and time, the proportionality of actions to the moral law as a primary condition for attaining the highest good, and the concept of the kingdom of ends. While these parallels may reflect the depth of the influence of Swedenborgian experiences on the Kantian system or the possibility of a shared origin, they do not undermine the originality of Kant's philosophy.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77656_3df8142f7e6ce461f3969c5b938c39bd.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 Some Critical Observations on Park’s Refusal of de Ray’s Argument against Metaphysical Naturalism Some Critical Observations on Park’s Refusal of de Ray’s Argument against Metaphysical Naturalism 123 136 77652 10.30497/prr.2024.246761.1939 FA Seyyed Mohammad Mahdi Etemadoleslami Bakhtiari Assistant Professor, Science and Technology Studies Group, Department of Management, Science and Technology, Amirkabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0006-9214-1792 Journal Article 2024 08 03 Christophe de Ray (2022) in “A New Epistemological Case for Theism” develops a new argument against metaphysical naturalism. He bases the first premise of this argument at least on two assumptions: (i) IBE requires the metaphysical belief, i.e. the belief that states of affairs generally have explanations, and (ii) there can be no causal relationship between the explainability of states of affairs and the metaphysical belief. Rejecting these assumptions, Park (2023) argues that (a) the metaphysical belief requires IBE, and (b) the states of affairs cause the metaphysical belief. This paper critically examines Park’s lines of argument. Firstly, it will be argued that his arguments against (i) carry ambiguities with themselves. Moreover, it is shown that Park’s arguments for (a) are problematic since he confuses the epistemological and ontological applications of the notion of explainability, in addition to the confusion between the process of forming a belief and justifying it. Last but not least, it is argued that his argument for (b) confuses the cause of metaphysical belief and the reason for it. Christophe de Ray (2022) in “A New Epistemological Case for Theism” develops a new argument against metaphysical naturalism. He bases the first premise of this argument at least on two assumptions: (i) IBE requires the metaphysical belief, i.e. the belief that states of affairs generally have explanations, and (ii) there can be no causal relationship between the explainability of states of affairs and the metaphysical belief. Rejecting these assumptions, Park (2023) argues that (a) the metaphysical belief requires IBE, and (b) the states of affairs cause the metaphysical belief. This paper critically examines Park’s lines of argument. Firstly, it will be argued that his arguments against (i) carry ambiguities with themselves. Moreover, it is shown that Park’s arguments for (a) are problematic since he confuses the epistemological and ontological applications of the notion of explainability, in addition to the confusion between the process of forming a belief and justifying it. Last but not least, it is argued that his argument for (b) confuses the cause of metaphysical belief and the reason for it.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77652_173ac47291dba8b597b70da592a29f2f.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 04 06 A Critical Study of al-Sharīf al-Raḍī’s Theological Views about God in Talkhīṣ al-Bayān ʿan Majāzāt al-Qurʾan A Critical Study of al-Sharīf al-Raḍī’s Theological Views about God in Talkhīṣ al-Bayān ʿan Majāzāt al-Qurʾan 137 153 77655 10.30497/prr.2025.246260.1916 FA Amir Zowqi Assistant Professor, Department of Quran and Hadith, Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0005-8538-5687 Journal Article 2024 05 09 Al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, the renowned Shia scholar and poet of the 10th century, mostly known for his compilation of Nahj al-Balāgha, has authored a big commentary on the Holy Quran named Ḥaqāʾiq al-Taʾwīl fī Mutashābih al-Tanzīl (The Realities of Metaphorical Interpretation in the Ambiguous Verses of Revelation) and summarized it later in Talkhīṣ al-Bayān ʽan Majāzāt al-Qurʼan (A Summary of the Clarification on the Metaphors of the Quran). Being a disciple of Qāḍī ʿAbdul-Jabbār in theology and hence becoming acquainted with Muʽtazilite theological views, he interpreted the verses that imply anthropomorphism and injustice of God in accordance with Muʽtazilite school. In this paper, while investigating al-Raḍī's theological presuppositions in the interpretation of the Quran, especially that of metaphor's extent, we criticize them in comparison with antagonist views. According to this study, the most important neglected aspects in al-Raḍī's commentary which led to his excessive metaphorical exegesis are as follows: (1) acknowledgement of analogical metaphors, (2) the feasibility of allegorical exegesis, (3) interpretation according to the esoteric aspect of the world, and (4) interpretation in accordance with the theory of the designation of the words for the spirits of meaning. Al-Sharīf al-Raḍī, the renowned Shia scholar and poet of the 10th century, mostly known for his compilation of Nahj al-Balāgha, has authored a big commentary on the Holy Quran named Ḥaqāʾiq al-Taʾwīl fī Mutashābih al-Tanzīl (The Realities of Metaphorical Interpretation in the Ambiguous Verses of Revelation) and summarized it later in Talkhīṣ al-Bayān ʽan Majāzāt al-Qurʼan (A Summary of the Clarification on the Metaphors of the Quran). Being a disciple of Qāḍī ʿAbdul-Jabbār in theology and hence becoming acquainted with Muʽtazilite theological views, he interpreted the verses that imply anthropomorphism and injustice of God in accordance with Muʽtazilite school. In this paper, while investigating al-Raḍī's theological presuppositions in the interpretation of the Quran, especially that of metaphor's extent, we criticize them in comparison with antagonist views. According to this study, the most important neglected aspects in al-Raḍī's commentary which led to his excessive metaphorical exegesis are as follows: (1) acknowledgement of analogical metaphors, (2) the feasibility of allegorical exegesis, (3) interpretation according to the esoteric aspect of the world, and (4) interpretation in accordance with the theory of the designation of the words for the spirits of meaning.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77655_0ee45e13f3ae8584d9d8d7e1d5214b97.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 The Problem of Evil in Euteleology Based on the Viewpoints of Bishop & Perszyk The Problem of Evil in Euteleology Based on the Viewpoints of Bishop & Perszyk 155 169 77653 10.30497/prr.2025.247631.1972 FA Siavash Asadi Adjunct Faculty Member, Antioch College, Yellow Spring, Ohio, USA 0000-0001-7012-6109 Journal Article 2024 12 05 In addressing "the logical problem of evil," theistic philosophers have sought to demonstrate the logical compatibility of evil and the existence of God. However, most of the defenses presented in this context which are based on the presumption of a personal God, have been criticized and questioned. This issue has led thinkers such as Bishop & Perszyk to propose an alternative conception of God while maintaining Christian doctrines. According to them, the least contentious conception of God can be articulated within the framework of euteleology. This theological view, which is based on a particular interpretation of an impersonal God, sees the world as a purposeful whole without the need for a supernatural creator, moving towards its ultimate end, namely, love or the highest good. However, this does not imply that the highest good will eventually be realized, but rather that it is already actualized and present within the reality of all beings. In this view, evils manifest as natural consequences of the unfolding of the physical world towards the highest good, without God being the cause or responsible for their existence. In addressing "the logical problem of evil," theistic philosophers have sought to demonstrate the logical compatibility of evil and the existence of God. However, most of the defenses presented in this context which are based on the presumption of a personal God, have been criticized and questioned. This issue has led thinkers such as Bishop & Perszyk to propose an alternative conception of God while maintaining Christian doctrines. According to them, the least contentious conception of God can be articulated within the framework of euteleology. This theological view, which is based on a particular interpretation of an impersonal God, sees the world as a purposeful whole without the need for a supernatural creator, moving towards its ultimate end, namely, love or the highest good. However, this does not imply that the highest good will eventually be realized, but rather that it is already actualized and present within the reality of all beings. In this view, evils manifest as natural consequences of the unfolding of the physical world towards the highest good, without God being the cause or responsible for their existence.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77653_bf5e400e9954db97a42a4c597a886716.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 Islam and the Problem of Evil: A Bibliographic Survey of English-Language Scholarship Islam and the Problem of Evil: A Bibliographic Survey of English-Language Scholarship 171 179 77654 10.30497/prr.2025.247947.1989 FA Saida Mirsadri Post-doc Research Fellow, Faculty of Catholic Theology, University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany 0000-0001-9870-2681 Journal Article 2024 12 10 The human catastrophes of World War II, along with the experience of the Holocaust—occurring after the dominance of Enlightenment rationality and its associated values—gave rise to profound existential and philosophical questions. These inquiries led to the emergence of a robust discourse on evil within the Western philosophical and theological traditions. In this context, atheistic philosophers questioned the rationality of traditional theism and its approach to the problem of evil. Additionally, anti-theodicy movements emerged, condemning any attempt to justify evils as shameful and morally indefensible. Against this backdrop, Jewish and Christian theologians, along with theistic philosophers, engaged in a reevaluation of their religious traditions, offering more resilient responses to the problem of evil. However, in the Islamic world, scholars have shown relatively little interest in such a reexamination. This paper provides a brief survey of contemporary works on Islam and the problem of evil, demonstrating that the few existing studies often reiterate classical and traditional responses or dismiss the discourse on evil as a Western and foreign concern. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that Islamic theology still needs to address the existential and human dimensions of evil and to offer practical responses to this enduring challenge. The human catastrophes of World War II, along with the experience of the Holocaust—occurring after the dominance of Enlightenment rationality and its associated values—gave rise to profound existential and philosophical questions. These inquiries led to the emergence of a robust discourse on evil within the Western philosophical and theological traditions. In this context, atheistic philosophers questioned the rationality of traditional theism and its approach to the problem of evil. Additionally, anti-theodicy movements emerged, condemning any attempt to justify evils as shameful and morally indefensible. Against this backdrop, Jewish and Christian theologians, along with theistic philosophers, engaged in a reevaluation of their religious traditions, offering more resilient responses to the problem of evil. However, in the Islamic world, scholars have shown relatively little interest in such a reexamination. This paper provides a brief survey of contemporary works on Islam and the problem of evil, demonstrating that the few existing studies often reiterate classical and traditional responses or dismiss the discourse on evil as a Western and foreign concern. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that Islamic theology still needs to address the existential and human dimensions of evil and to offer practical responses to this enduring challenge.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77654_d7d5c18f73a909f762d64e82e009c6bf.pdf

Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 23 1 2025 03 21 Beauty and the Meaning of Life in Farabi’s Philosophy: A Reinterpretation for Contemporary Humanity Beauty and the Meaning of Life in Farabi’s Philosophy: A Reinterpretation for Contemporary Humanity 181 199 77666 10.30497/prr.2025.247897.1986 FA Reyhaneh Davoodi Kahaki Ph.D. Graduate in Islamic Philosophy and Kalam, Science and Research Branch, Islamic Azad University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0004-3834-763X Rasoul RAHBARI GHAZANI PhD Candidate of Philosophy of Religion, Istanbul University, Istanbul, Turkey 0000-0001-6620-2340 Journal Article 2024 12 22 The question of life’s meaning has always been a fundamental challenge in philosophy. Two major perspectives dominate this discourse: one views life’s meaning as something to be discovered within the metaphysical order of existence, while the other considers it a construct shaped by personal experiences and self-created values. This paper examines Farabi’s philosophical system to address this debate through the lens of the relationship between beauty and the meaning of life. Farabi presents beauty not merely as an aesthetic concept but as a pathway to attaining happiness and uncovering truth. In his view, real beauty manifests across different ontological levels, from the sensory to the intellectual, guiding human beings toward harmony with metaphysical reality. This study demonstrates that, in Farabi’s framework, beauty plays a dual role: on one hand, it serves as a means to discover the objective meaning of life through alignment with the Active Intellect; on the other, it allows individuals to reproduce and manifest meaning within their particular experiences. Thus, Farabi’s philosophy not only affirms the discovery of meaning but also grants a role to personal experience in realizing this meaning. The findings of this study suggest that by providing a intellectual and ontological structure for beauty, Farabi offers a resolution to the debate between the discovery and creation of life’s meaning. The question of life’s meaning has always been a fundamental challenge in philosophy. Two major perspectives dominate this discourse: one views life’s meaning as something to be discovered within the metaphysical order of existence, while the other considers it a construct shaped by personal experiences and self-created values. This paper examines Farabi’s philosophical system to address this debate through the lens of the relationship between beauty and the meaning of life. Farabi presents beauty not merely as an aesthetic concept but as a pathway to attaining happiness and uncovering truth. In his view, real beauty manifests across different ontological levels, from the sensory to the intellectual, guiding human beings toward harmony with metaphysical reality. This study demonstrates that, in Farabi’s framework, beauty plays a dual role: on one hand, it serves as a means to discover the objective meaning of life through alignment with the Active Intellect; on the other, it allows individuals to reproduce and manifest meaning within their particular experiences. Thus, Farabi’s philosophy not only affirms the discovery of meaning but also grants a role to personal experience in realizing this meaning. The findings of this study suggest that by providing a intellectual and ontological structure for beauty, Farabi offers a resolution to the debate between the discovery and creation of life’s meaning.

https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_77666_a510f1dfb2da9c8ab0b448e12fcea031.pdf