Imam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Tripartite Definition of knowledge and Fourth ConditionTripartite Definition of knowledge and Fourth Condition928120310.30497/prr.2012.1203FA Abdollrasul KashfiAssistant Professor at Shiraz University, Shiraz, Iran0000-0002-5702-2281Journal Article20121216In Teatetus, Plato defines knowledge as “true Justified belief ”. Known as tripartite definition (or analysis) of knowledge, by 1960s it was a dominant definition for knowledge. In 1963, American philosopher Edmund Gettier in short paper, accepting necessity of three parts, has presented us with two counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is completely justified true belief. Since that, it has given numerous answers to Gettier’s counterexamples. Some of these answers accept Gettier’s objection to sufficiency of three fold conditions, try to complete it by adding a fourth condition. This essay surveys and criticizes answers of this kind and shows that these efforts werenot successful by now and that Gettier’s objection is yet remained.In Teatetus, Plato defines knowledge as “true Justified belief ”. Known as tripartite definition (or analysis) of knowledge, by 1960s it was a dominant definition for knowledge. In 1963, American philosopher Edmund Gettier in short paper, accepting necessity of three parts, has presented us with two counterexamples to the claim that knowledge is completely justified true belief. Since that, it has given numerous answers to Gettier’s counterexamples. Some of these answers accept Gettier’s objection to sufficiency of three fold conditions, try to complete it by adding a fourth condition. This essay surveys and criticizes answers of this kind and shows that these efforts werenot successful by now and that Gettier’s objection is yet remained.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1203_b1766eecf923c910cf370136525176ad.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Justifying Epistemological Theory of Mullā SadrāJustifying Epistemological Theory of Mullā Sadrā2950120410.30497/prr.2012.1204FABeyookAlizadehAssistant Professor of Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216In Islamic philosophy before Mullā Sadrā epistemology was not principal concern of philosophers, and what they have said in this matter was in relation to other problems. First Mullā Sadrā take this problem seriously and after examining sayings of prior philosophers, theorizes about it. Epistemological theory of Mullā Sadrā consist of three fundamental elements: scientific forms or images (object per se), the subject (soul), and mutual relations that scientific forms acquire in process of knowing. On the one hand, scientific forms represent beyond themselves and are intermediaries of our knowledge of other things, and on the other hand, they are in relation to the subject and are acquired in soul. Mullā Sadrā has novelties about all above-mentioned elements, and from all of them has made a novel and powerful theory of knowledge. While Mullā Sadrā theorizing is coherent with his system of philosophy, his theory lacks coherent justification. This diverge view of commentators on his theory. Assumption of this essay is that Mullā Sadrā system of philosophy has necessary tools and possibilities for justifying his theory. Hence, in this essay, at first we briefly introduce epistemological theory of Mullā Sadrā and compare it with theories of prior muslim philosophers,and then reconstruct its reasons, It must to be said that part of Mullā Sadrā theory that was more challenging, ie, relation of scientific forms with soul, is principal concern of this essay.In Islamic philosophy before Mullā Sadrā epistemology was not principal concern of philosophers, and what they have said in this matter was in relation to other problems. First Mullā Sadrā take this problem seriously and after examining sayings of prior philosophers, theorizes about it. Epistemological theory of Mullā Sadrā consist of three fundamental elements: scientific forms or images (object per se), the subject (soul), and mutual relations that scientific forms acquire in process of knowing. On the one hand, scientific forms represent beyond themselves and are intermediaries of our knowledge of other things, and on the other hand, they are in relation to the subject and are acquired in soul. Mullā Sadrā has novelties about all above-mentioned elements, and from all of them has made a novel and powerful theory of knowledge. While Mullā Sadrā theorizing is coherent with his system of philosophy, his theory lacks coherent justification. This diverge view of commentators on his theory. Assumption of this essay is that Mullā Sadrā system of philosophy has necessary tools and possibilities for justifying his theory. Hence, in this essay, at first we briefly introduce epistemological theory of Mullā Sadrā and compare it with theories of prior muslim philosophers,and then reconstruct its reasons, It must to be said that part of Mullā Sadrā theory that was more challenging, ie, relation of scientific forms with soul, is principal concern of this essay.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1204_048903c25d1dc8a052fda260cba2d26c.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Object and Objectivity in Theoretical Philosophy of KantObject and Objectivity in Theoretical Philosophy of Kant5170120510.30497/prr.2012.1205FAHosseinHooshangiAssistant Professor of Imam Sadiq University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216Copernican revolution of Kant and his opening a way between empiricism and rationalism was centred round a new conception of object, thing, and objectivity. Reducing thing to object and passing from object to object of knowledge and painting “object” in mental colours, is a long way that kant was passed, by keeping distance from prior philosophical traditions. Showing exactly what is the function of “object” in uniting sensible representations by grasping them in concepts and combining these concepts in a judgment, and seeking the role of other concepts, specially pure concepts of the understanding, in relation to object and the function of uniting are other related topics. Kant’s explanation of how apriori synthetic judgments are possible, and how empirical judgments are distinguishable from subjective judgments are based in some sense on certain conception of “object” in his theoretical philosophy. For Kant, objectivity and truth are clarified in light of this discussion. Then, along with dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon, Kant divides thing into empirical and transcendental, and surveys relation of these two divisions and their consequences with idealism, subjectivism or phenomenalism. Hence, we consider that the concept of “object” and fundamental concepts and doctrines of Kant’s philosophy make a complicated network, so that examining this concept provides a key to systematic understanding of philosophy of Kant.Copernican revolution of Kant and his opening a way between empiricism and rationalism was centred round a new conception of object, thing, and objectivity. Reducing thing to object and passing from object to object of knowledge and painting “object” in mental colours, is a long way that kant was passed, by keeping distance from prior philosophical traditions. Showing exactly what is the function of “object” in uniting sensible representations by grasping them in concepts and combining these concepts in a judgment, and seeking the role of other concepts, specially pure concepts of the understanding, in relation to object and the function of uniting are other related topics. Kant’s explanation of how apriori synthetic judgments are possible, and how empirical judgments are distinguishable from subjective judgments are based in some sense on certain conception of “object” in his theoretical philosophy. For Kant, objectivity and truth are clarified in light of this discussion. Then, along with dichotomy of noumenon and phenomenon, Kant divides thing into empirical and transcendental, and surveys relation of these two divisions and their consequences with idealism, subjectivism or phenomenalism. Hence, we consider that the concept of “object” and fundamental concepts and doctrines of Kant’s philosophy make a complicated network, so that examining this concept provides a key to systematic understanding of philosophy of Kant.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1205_278af2289470512a92f8badee6ff51ad.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Problems of Book III (B) of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: A way to Uderstanding the Structure of MetaphysicsProblems of Book III (B) of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: A way to Uderstanding the Structure of Metaphysics7192120610.30497/prr.2012.1206FAAmirMaziarPhD student of Philosophy of Art, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216One of the difficulties of understanding and commentating on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” is understanding the structure of it. While ancient commentator of metaphysics regarded it as one collection that have Coherent structure, most of the modern commentators on Aristotle hold that this collection does not have unity and its topics, specially topic of ontology in middle books and topic of theology in final books, do not have philosophical consistency with each other. In this essay, based on problems of book III (B), which can be regarded as Metaphysics’ table of contents, it is tried to offer a theory about structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and to criticize different theories in this matter.One of the difficulties of understanding and commentating on Aristotle’s “Metaphysics” is understanding the structure of it. While ancient commentator of metaphysics regarded it as one collection that have Coherent structure, most of the modern commentators on Aristotle hold that this collection does not have unity and its topics, specially topic of ontology in middle books and topic of theology in final books, do not have philosophical consistency with each other. In this essay, based on problems of book III (B), which can be regarded as Metaphysics’ table of contents, it is tried to offer a theory about structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and to criticize different theories in this matter.Imam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Definition and Goal of Logic from Muslim Logicians’ View pointDefinition and Goal of Logic from Muslim Logicians’ View point111124120710.30497/prr.2012.1207FASeyyad MahmoodYousofsaniAssistant Professor at The Iranian Institute of Philosophy, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216
In this essay, the author tries to classify definitions, which were offered by muslim logicians for logic, into two categories of intrinsic and derivative definitions, and to separate form and matter oriented goals from merely form directed goals that they cite for logic. Then he infers from their sayings that logic according to its definition and goal is primarily and essentially directed to not matter but form of thought, and that two parts of logic, ie, concept and assent, are basically relevant to not context of definition but of argumentation, and that the discussions concerning matter of argument and definition must be sought in other special disciplines. In this essay, also the relation between logic and syntax, and reasons of needlessness of some sciences to logic has been studied.
In this essay, the author tries to classify definitions, which were offered by muslim logicians for logic, into two categories of intrinsic and derivative definitions, and to separate form and matter oriented goals from merely form directed goals that they cite for logic. Then he infers from their sayings that logic according to its definition and goal is primarily and essentially directed to not matter but form of thought, and that two parts of logic, ie, concept and assent, are basically relevant to not context of definition but of argumentation, and that the discussions concerning matter of argument and definition must be sought in other special disciplines. In this essay, also the relation between logic and syntax, and reasons of needlessness of some sciences to logic has been studied.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1207_88fd11fac624b5ad9140123c2ec0423e.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Aristotle and Problem of SubstanceAristotle and Problem of Substance93110120810.30497/prr.2012.1208FAMortezaQaraїFaculty member at K. N. Toosi University, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216In this essay, at first we glance one’s eye down most important intellectual concern of Pre-Socratics, which can be seen as context and origin for idea of substance, and then look at Aristotle’s stand on two intellectual trends before himself, ie, Platonism and materialism, and finally we try to report and in some cases, analyse and criticize Aristotle view of the problem of substance, two meanings he meant by it and its attributes in first meaning, according to Organon and Metaphysics.In this essay, at first we glance one’s eye down most important intellectual concern of Pre-Socratics, which can be seen as context and origin for idea of substance, and then look at Aristotle’s stand on two intellectual trends before himself, ie, Platonism and materialism, and finally we try to report and in some cases, analyse and criticize Aristotle view of the problem of substance, two meanings he meant by it and its attributes in first meaning, according to Organon and Metaphysics.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1208_4ba43a32993ed13c701fc810ce0bda82.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420De Dicto and De Re ModalitiesDe Dicto and De Re Modalities125148120910.30497/prr.2012.1209FAMohammadSáidi MehrAssistant Professor at Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran0000-0003-4663-5792Journal Article20121216Nowadays, one of the most important discussions in modal logic and analytic metaphysics is the distinction between de dicto and de re modalities. For example, one of the basic foundation of accepting essentialism is acceptance of de re necessity. This essay points to the history of this distinction in Islamic and Western Philosophy, and then deals with syntactical and semantical difference between these two kinds of modality, and compares this distinction with two similar distinctions, and finally looks at relationship of de dicto and de re modalities.Nowadays, one of the most important discussions in modal logic and analytic metaphysics is the distinction between de dicto and de re modalities. For example, one of the basic foundation of accepting essentialism is acceptance of de re necessity. This essay points to the history of this distinction in Islamic and Western Philosophy, and then deals with syntactical and semantical difference between these two kinds of modality, and compares this distinction with two similar distinctions, and finally looks at relationship of de dicto and de re modalities.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1209_61d00f38c6fd3c6ce2ccd209469de838.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Ethical Relativism as Epistemological Stance: David Wong’s viewEthical Relativism as Epistemological Stance: David Wong’s view149182121010.30497/prr.2012.1210FAMasoudSadegi AliabadiFaculty member at Research Institute of Imam Khomeini and Islamic Revolution, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216Epistemological relativism presupposes at least some fundamental moral differences, and addresses those differences in terms of epistemic values such as truth and justifiability. To suggest relativist analysis of moral statements which account for both cognitive locutions found in moral language and the differences in moral beliefs is main task of Wong’s theory, that also considered new developments in philosophy of language. This essay consists of five sections: introduction; recent development in philosophy of language; faults of prior relativist theories; Wong’s relativist analysis of moral statements; critique of Wong’s relativist analysis.Epistemological relativism presupposes at least some fundamental moral differences, and addresses those differences in terms of epistemic values such as truth and justifiability. To suggest relativist analysis of moral statements which account for both cognitive locutions found in moral language and the differences in moral beliefs is main task of Wong’s theory, that also considered new developments in philosophy of language. This essay consists of five sections: introduction; recent development in philosophy of language; faults of prior relativist theories; Wong’s relativist analysis of moral statements; critique of Wong’s relativist analysis.https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1210_1537615e5d6d99208b699a18fda00182.pdfImam Sadiq UniversityPhilosophy of Religion Research2228-65782120040420Ethical Non-Objectivism: Cultural Relativism and Ethical SubjectivismEthical Non-Objectivism: Cultural Relativism and Ethical Subjectivism183215121110.30497/prr.2012.1211FAIraj Ahmadi (trans)James Rachels (author)Translator and Researcher, Tehran, IranJournal Article20121216Cultural relativism and ethical subjectivism are two theories that are against ethical objectivism. In this essay, James Rachels shows that cultural relativism is based on invalid argument; that the consequences of taking it seriously are irrational; that it exaggerates moral disagreement. Yet he holds that we can learn lessons from it. Next, he presents and criticizes two versions of ethical subjectivism; the first version (simple personalism) is rejected by him, because it denies the facts of humen fallibility and moral disagreement. The second version (emotivism) is regarded incomplete, because it can not explain the role of reason and argumentation in ethics. He shows that argumentation and reasoning in ethics is possible and favourable, and because of this, ethics is objective, not subject to personal taste or cultural assumptions of cultural assumption of one special societyCultural relativism and ethical subjectivism are two theories that are against ethical objectivism. In this essay, James Rachels shows that cultural relativism is based on invalid argument; that the consequences of taking it seriously are irrational; that it exaggerates moral disagreement. Yet he holds that we can learn lessons from it. Next, he presents and criticizes two versions of ethical subjectivism; the first version (simple personalism) is rejected by him, because it denies the facts of humen fallibility and moral disagreement. The second version (emotivism) is regarded incomplete, because it can not explain the role of reason and argumentation in ethics. He shows that argumentation and reasoning in ethics is possible and favourable, and because of this, ethics is objective, not subject to personal taste or cultural assumptions of cultural assumption of one special societyhttps://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1211_108a79c3ff70e6640d3eb2a441c225f8.pdf