Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 24 1 2026 05 22 The Relation of Human Will to Causality and Divine Knowledge: A New Explanation of the Problem of Free Will The Relation of Human Will to Causality and Divine Knowledge: A New Explanation of the Problem of Free Will 109 125 78176 10.30497/prr.2026.248062.2001 FA Hosein Souzanchi Professor, Department of Social Sciences, University of Baqir al-Olum, Qom, Iran. 0000-0003-1733-3138 Journal Article 2025 04 14 The common solution in Islamic philosophy to the problem of free will is of the kind that, while accepting the generality of causal necessity and God's eternal knowledge, seeks to find a place for human will (al-irāda). However, in this solution, the "Best of All Possible Worlds" (<em>al-niẓām al-aḥsan</em>) is reduced to the "only possible world", as if a confusion has arisen between God's knowledge and His wisdom, and the scope of God's power is constrained. Moreover, in this model, the explanation of will in human beings does not differ significantly from the explanation of will in animals. In the present paper, employing the method of philosophical analysis and taking as its foundation the theory of "the extensiveness of reality beyond existence" (accepting reality for possible worlds), and by providing a ground for accepting preference based on priority (<em>awlawiyya</em>) instead of necessity (<em>ḍarūra</em>), a different conception of the Best of All Possible Worlds is presented. This conception, while taking seriously the fundamental difference between human beings and other creatures, explains human free will in such a way that, while accepting the principle "a thing, as long as it is not necessary, does not come into existence" (<em>al-shayʾ mā lam yajib lam yūjad</em>) within each possible world, and negating its applicability to specifically human acts of willing, it becomes possible to defend the existence of various options before the human being and the possibility of choosing among them. This new explanation of the problem of free will, in addition to being immune to the objections raised against previous solutions, is also capable of resolving certain difficulties such as the problem of <em>badāʾ</em>. The common solution in Islamic philosophy to the problem of free will is of the kind that, while accepting the generality of causal necessity and God's eternal knowledge, seeks to find a place for human will (al-irāda). However, in this solution, the "Best of All Possible Worlds" (<em>al-niẓām al-aḥsan</em>) is reduced to the "only possible world", as if a confusion has arisen between God's knowledge and His wisdom, and the scope of God's power is constrained. Moreover, in this model, the explanation of will in human beings does not differ significantly from the explanation of will in animals. In the present paper, employing the method of philosophical analysis and taking as its foundation the theory of "the extensiveness of reality beyond existence" (accepting reality for possible worlds), and by providing a ground for accepting preference based on priority (<em>awlawiyya</em>) instead of necessity (<em>ḍarūra</em>), a different conception of the Best of All Possible Worlds is presented. This conception, while taking seriously the fundamental difference between human beings and other creatures, explains human free will in such a way that, while accepting the principle "a thing, as long as it is not necessary, does not come into existence" (<em>al-shayʾ mā lam yajib lam yūjad</em>) within each possible world, and negating its applicability to specifically human acts of willing, it becomes possible to defend the existence of various options before the human being and the possibility of choosing among them. This new explanation of the problem of free will, in addition to being immune to the objections raised against previous solutions, is also capable of resolving certain difficulties such as the problem of <em>badāʾ</em>. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_78176_8dac70a5eb69233e7fa4af5d782fa115.pdf