Imam Sadiq University Philosophy of Religion Research 2228-6578 15 1 2017 04 21 The New Logical Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense The New Logical Problem of Evil and Free Will Defense 191 212 1972 10.30497/prr.2017.1972 FA Fatemeh Namavar PhD student of logic, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. Lotfollah Nabavi Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran. (Corresponding Author) Mohammad Saeedimehr Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0003-4663-5792 Journal Article 2017 02 27 The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution. The argument based on the existence of evil in the world, as an atheistic argument against the existence of God, has two versions: logical and evidential. In this article, we have merely dealt with the first version that attempts to prove a logical inconsistency in the theists’ set of beliefs. Many hold that the traditional logical problem of evil has found a definite answer through Plantinga’s free will defense. However, in recent years, John Schellenberg has claimed a new logical problem of evil. He holds that Plantinga’s free will defense would not refute this new version. In the present paper, without any concern for fully criticizing Schellenberg’s new problem of evil and without any intent for completely representing Plantinga’s free will defense, we have challenged Schellenberg’s claim about the immunity of his version to Plantinga’s free will defense. Through undermining one of the central premises of his argument, we prove that this version is also vulnerable to plantinga’s solution. https://prrj.isu.ac.ir/article_1972_c4de8ced6214345614d33fb0b16a8acd.pdf